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ABSTRACT 
To be commercially viable as a bioenergy feedstock, switchgrass must be cost-
competitive. Switchgrass production and delivery costs are calculated fo r the 
Chariton Valley Switchgrass Biomass Project located in the Chariton Valley, Iowa. 
Sensitivity analyses are performed to determine which variables have the greatest 
impact on cost. Switchgrass production costs would require higher than expected 
market prices and therefore various incentive payment options are considered. The 
incentive payments attempt to encapsulate the positive environmental attributes from 
the production of switchgrass as well as using switchgrass a clean energy coal 
substitute. A modified CRP payment, carbon payment and green tag payment are all 
considered, and their re lati ve advantages and disadvantages are discussed. The 
modified CRP payment and the green tag payment are shown to have significant 
potential for offsetting high swi tchgrass costs of production. 
CHAPTER J. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a serious cons ideration of larger-scale commercial opportunities fo r 
green energy use in both the public and private sectors in recent years. A variety of different 
green sources have been cons idered and deve loped. Wind, water , photovolta ic, and solar 
power seem to be the foc us of most green energy initi atives in large commerci.al practice. 
However, the use of biofuels as a renewable energy opti on is growing rapidly in stature. 
The term " biofuels" inc ludes such va lue-added fuels as ethanol m ethano l and 
biodiesel. Such fuels have a lready estab li shed a relatively strong and developed market. The 
U.S. ethano l industry in particular is the fas test growing energy industry in the world 
(Dinneen 2004). However, there is a lesser known category of bio-based energy sources. 
S ignifi cant research continues to be done on uti.l izing a renewable biom ass energy crop as a 
substitute fo r coal. A wide variety of herbaceous crops and fast-growing trees have been 
studied to deten11ine which culti vars offer the grea test production and energy potentia l. In 
most cases, the high yielding perennial grass species produce the most desirab le outcomes. 
Determining which var iety of grass would wo rk best depends on geographic location and 
other specific agronom ic concerns. However in many projects, one particu lar spec ies, 
switchgrass, exhibited superior energy and conservation attributes, along with excel lent 
compatibility to conventiona l fam1ing practices (McLaughli n 1999). 
Understandi ng the economic potential of switchgrass as a biofuel a lternative has 
important implications for clean energy generation and feas ibili ty. Both the public and 
private sectors have funded research designed to investigate the costs of producing 
switchgrass re lative to other conventional energy sources. Continuing research remains 
important to detenn ine most accurately the co ts o f production of these sources. 
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The production of switchgrass as an energy source presents unique facets for 
examination because its production would be agricultu rally based, i.e. grown and harvested 
just like any other agricultural commodity. The farmers decision whether to raise the crop 
wou ld be connected to its production costs. ln a competi tive agricultural marketplace, most 
fa1mers would on ly choose to produce switcbgrass if their profit margins are at least equa l to 
those from their next-best alternative. Before switchgrass can be utilized by industry as a 
widespread bioenergy crop, farmers must be able to profitably supply it. 
The first purpose of thi s master's thesis is to examine the economic potential of 
switchgrass as a v iable biofue l alternative by estimating its on-farm costs of production, 
storage and deli very. The second purpose is to address specific government and market-
based policies and/or subs idies that wou ld fu1ther improve on-farm profitability. The focus 
of the analysis of these policies will be centered on incentive opportunities available through 
altering Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) payments, through utilization of carbon 
payments for carbon sequestration by switchgrass, and through utilization of green payments 
as compensation for the environmental benefits associated with using switchgrass. These 
income incentives will be important in determining if farmers are able to ensure a net income 
at least equal to that associated with raising thei r next-best alternative. 
The Chariton Va lley Biomass Project is a switchgrass research venture in south 
central Iowa funded by a grant through the U.S. Department of Energy. The project wi ll 
serve as a case study model. A ll production costs are based on switchgrass production 
occurring in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY AND LlTERA TURE OVERVIEW 
Positive externalities and their role in profitability could come with the use of 
switcbgrass contribute to its economic viability. A theoretical discussion of externalities 
follows. 
Externalities 
By defin ition, an externality ari ses when an argument in the production or utili ty 
function of one individual enters into the production or utility function of a second individual, 
the effects of which are not considered by the first individual when making choices. It can be 
thought of more generally as an effect that occurs when the production or consumption of a 
given good by one economic agent affects a second agent, but this effect is not taken into 
account by the first agent in his production or consumption deci sions. It is commonly 
referred to as a "spillover" effect, in that the extemality effects of producing or consuming 
the good "spill over" and impact an unintended second party. Representing the true costs or 
benefits of this spillover effect in the production or consumption decis ions of all affected 
parties has the potentia l of a s ignificant effect on their subsequent choices. 
Both positive and negati ve extemali ty effects are possible. If a fa rmer bas cattle 
grazing in a pasture, and motorists driving by the pasture notice and take pleasure in the 
beauty of the rural scene, then a positive extemality is being generated. The cattle are 
generating external aesthetic benefits that are not go ing to be reflected in their market value. 
Converse ly, say a hog confinement owner began running hog manure from his confinement 
operation into a nearby recreational water body used by the public. The health hazards and 
other associated environmental problems wou ld be considered a negative extemality 
affecting a ll individuals using the water body. The confinement owner wou ld not be 
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accounting for the cost to those individua ls when choosing whether or not to dispose of the 
hog waste in that way. 
Positive and negative externa lities exist in the use of coal versus switchg:rass. The 
cheap cost of coa l does not reflect the negative environmental effects generated by its use. 
The more expensive cost of switchgrass fa ils to include the environmental benefits brought 
about by both its production and its use at the power plru1t. All externalities add either costs 
or net value to their use; therefore it is importrult to inc lude them in an analysis between the 
two. 
The use of coal by power plants generates many negative environmental externalities. 
Gases such as sulfur ox ides and nitrogen dioxides released in the burning process contribute 
heavily to acid rain and smog. They lead to respiratory health hazards in addition to 
substantial environmental damages such as the altering of pH levels in waterways and soils. 
There are indirect effects on both plants growing in affected soils and animals that re ly on 
both the plants and the water to survive. Approximately two-thirds of all the sulfur diox ides 
and one-fourth of the nitrogen dioxides in Earth's atmosphere are released from power plants 
burning fossi l fuels like coal for e lectric power generation (Almanac of Policy Issues 2002). 
By far, the most substantia l gaseous by-product (by weight) of burning coal is carbon 
di.oxide. Class ified as a greenhouse gas and acting the primary contributor to the effects of 
global warming, carbon dioxide (C02) enters Earth's atmosphere on a much more rapid sca le. 
For example, one average-sized 500 MW coal plant (large enough to power a city of around 
140,000) would use approximately 1.43 million tons of coal to produce enough e lectricity for 
one year. The coal would annually generate approximately 10,000 tons of sulfur dioxi.de, 
10,200 tons of nitrogen oxide, and 3.7 mi llion tons ofC02 (Union of Concerned Scientists 
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2004). Given that 90% of the 1,090 million short tons of coal that were consumed in the U.S. 
in 2003 alone fo r electrical power generation, thi s would translate to approximately I. 
billion tons of C02 being rel ea ed in that year. Needless to say, C02 has now become a 
significant atmospheric presence (U.S. DOE, U.S. Counf!y Analysis Brief, 2004). 
Switchgrass production offers a counterpoint to coa l's C02 expulsion. Switchgrass 
takes in C02 from the atmosphere as pan of its life cycle and can sequester, or hold it in its 
system. Coal releases C02 as it bums, while switchgrass captures C02 as it grows. When 
the switchgrass is harvested and then burned to generate energy, it releases C02 in the same 
way coal does. However, burning switchgrass is considered more of a carbon-neutral 
feedstock. The carbon the switchgrass takes in helps to offset the carbon it releases when it 
is burned. This is in direct contrast to coal , which when burned is considered a net carbon 
emitter. ln addition, because switchgrass is a perennial grass that mainta ins a permanent root 
system, soi l organic carbon sequestered below-ground can remain there e en after harvest 
(Bransby 2002). 
From an environmental standpoint, switchgrass represents a very real possibility for 
sustained renewable energy generation. From an energy standpoint, researchers have found 
it to be one of the best biomass substitutes for coal. But can switchgrass be co l-
competiti vely grown by producers? Further, if necessary, could it be subsidized effectively 
to ensure its profitability? Two papers are helpful in examining these questions. 
The Conservation Reser e Program as a Means to Subsidize Bioenergy Crop Prices 
(\Valsh): 
Walsh et al discuss the financial opportunities of using the federal Con crvation 
Reserve Program (CRP)--established in the 1985 Farm Bill- as a means to create financial 
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incentives for bioenergy crop production. CRP promoted environmental stewardship on less 
producti ve or potentially environmentally sensitive fannland. Its goal was initia lly to create 
a land conservation incentive by offering rental payments in exchange for farmers agreeing 
to abstain from using the land. Conservation must be maintained, and no economic benefit 
can be accrued to the farmer from use of the contracted land. 
Bioenergy production (focused on switchgrass), however, is based on growing 
conservation crops. These crops naturally maintain the integrity of CRP's conservation and 
environmental obj ectives. If farmers were allowed to grow conservation crops like 
switchgrass for profit on their CRP land, and in return were given a reduced percentage of 
their full CRP renta l payment, the payment could serve as a de facto subsidy payment for the 
production of bioenergy crops and increase their competiti veness relative to fossil fuels. This 
scenario, however, would differ from the "standard subsidy scena1io" because tbe 
government would actually benefit as well, reaping the cost-saving benefits of paying out a 
reduced rental payment on those CRP acres (the federa l government explored such an idea 
for the 1995 Farm Bill as a way to reduce the program's cost, but the plan was dropped in the 
final version). 
Walsh et al attempt to estimate the potential of reduced CRP payments for increasing 
bioenergy crop competitiveness. They used both swi tchgrass and sho11 rotation woody crops 
as their bioenergy crop models. Data was gathered from the mid-Plains states, where 
switchgrass production is best supported . They assumed switchgrass production on all 
suitab le CRP acres (defined as all CRP acres in land capabi lity classes l-4) within the 
geographical range. Taking the fu ll CRP rental rate as the opportunity cost of putting the 
land into bioenergy crop production, they assumed fam1ers will choose to raise such crops 
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only if their expected income is at least equal to thei r opportunity cost (Equation (1 )). In 
Equation (1 ), the CRP rental rate is represented by R and tbe bioenergy crop price is 
represented by BP. The bioenergy crop yield and production cost are represented by Y and C, 
respectively. 
R = (BP · Y,J - C ( I) 
The authors d iscuss two different approaches to utilizing the CRP payment. They 
fi rst discuss the option of a deficiency-type payment. The deficiency payment would equal 
the difference between the established CRP rate and the profit they earn from the biomass 
crop. The maximum deficiency payment the government would pay out was defined to be 
full CRP rental payment (the payment situation that wou ld occur if farmers broke even and 
there was no profit). 
The authors also consider the idea of a set rental reduction payment. This payment 
along with bioenergy crop profits would have to equa l at least the ful l CRP payment without 
crop production in order to be a successful production incentive. This predetermined reduced 
payment percentage option has tbe added benefit of guaranteeing a set program cost to the 
government, depending on the percentage chosen. 
This research on ly evaluates the predetermined CRP reduced payment and not the 
modified deficiency payment. Therefore, empirica l results presented from the Walsh paper 
will on ly be for the predetermined reduced CRP payment. 
Utilizing two sample reduction rates of 20% and 40% and sample total crop harvest 
totals of 9. 1 M Mg and 45.5 M Mg (approximately JO and 50 mil lion tons, respective ly), they 
found the crop prices needed to create a state of indifference for producers between crop 
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production with the CRP subsidy and accepti ng the full CRP rental payment. Table l shows 
their resu lts. 
Walsh et a l estimate that' hen there are a total of ten million tons of witchgrass 
available for sale in the national market, a switchgras producer yielding four tons/acre off 
his land and receiving 80% percent of his CRP payment (i.e. a 20% reduction rate) would 
need a switch grass farmgate price of $2 1.82/ton. By the same token the same producer with 
the same payment and yield but operating with a national swi rchgrass yield of 50 million tons 
would yield a price of $27 .27 / ton. The authors note that these prices do not inc lude 
transportation costs to a user faci li ty, which is estimated to add between $5-$ 1 Olton 
depending on the distance traveled. 
Table I: Estimated Farmgate Prices Under CRP Reduction Rates (Wal h Table 2) 
Swi tchgrass 
20% CRP Reduction Rate 40% CRP Reduction Rate 
Yields 4 tons/ac 5 tons/ac 6 tons/ac 4 tons/ac 5 tons/ac 6 tons/ac 
At lOM $2 1.82 $20.00 $ 19.09 $23.64 $2 1.82 $20.9 1 
tons: 
At SOM $27.27 $25.45 $21.82 $30.9 l $28. 18 $25.45 
tons: 
The authors go on to discuss the likelihood of achieving these prices. They note that 
bioenergy prices hinge on not on ly yie ld but on total crop supply (i n other words, full 
participation by all eligible CRP contractors). Their work estimates switchgra s prices 
needed to make production profitable when large sca le production is already assumed, and 
they show the reduced payment to be a viable bioenergy subsidy. 
9 
Developing Switchgrass as a Bioenergy Crop (McLaughlin) 
McLaughlin et a l provide an extensive overview of many of the different facets of research 
going into determining exactly if and how switchgrass will be made a commerciall y viable 
bioenergy crop. The authors provide an in-depth examination into various molecular and 
agronomic aspects of the switchgrass species, the details of which wi ll not be discussed here. 
The relevant points taken from the work are the economic potential of switchgrass on a 
commercial leve l. 
Similar to Walsh et a l, McLaughlin et al emphasize the fundamental importance of 
any bioenergy crop to be able to compete, both as a stand-alone crop in addition to as a green 
fuel. As a p roduction crop, it must be ab le to at least match the net income possible from the 
land 's other potential use(s), and must do so in a stable and consistent way. Producers need 
assurance that not only will rais ing a bioenergy crop be profitable, but that it will be 
profitable consistently over time. Uncertainty and any subsequent ri sk involved in its ab il ity 
to provide them with a stab le income wi ll have a s ignificant effect on their desire to raise a 
crop. As a fuel, its quality must be ab le to rival other more traditional energy sources in 
addition to other green sources. 
After inc luding a detailed presentation of the current status of switchgrass agronomic 
research, McLaughlin et al move to an overall review of commercia l implications and 
considerations connected with switchgrass production. They first establish whether there is a 
need within the biomass-based fuel source market to warrant commercial production. 
Biomass wastes (for example, wood and agricu ltural residues), which are much cheaper and 
Jess labor-intens ive to supply, wou ld be considered switchgrass' initial rival. For this reason, 
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the authors place important consideration on these sources in establishing an initial biomass 
market. 
Biomass wastes are estimated to be capable of supplying between 18 and 60 percent 
of the production potential possible by raising energy crops on currently idle land. In 
addition, switchgrass production dedicated specifica lly for energy usage would also offer 
more stable control over feedstock suppl y, as well as over the quality and price of the supply. 
As a result, the abi lity to develop switchgrass into a competitive energy crop is considered 
important for future renewable energy market development (McLaughlin 1999). 
McLaughJin et al also report on the findings of an earlier study by Walsh et al (1998) 
that sought to find average national bioenergy cost estimations. They report that Walsh et 
al 's study found estimated average national production costs of bioenergy crops in general 
cou Id range from $22 to $ 11 O/dry Mg ($20 to $100/dry ton) and transportation costs from $5 
to $8/Mg ($4.55 to $7.27/dry ton), assuming an average 25 mile transport distance. These 
estimations encompass variables such as the geographic region of production, the type of 
crop produced (switcbgrass being one of the possible options), and the type of estimation 
method used. 
McLaughlin et al go on to further specify another interesting analysis. Table 2 shows 
the estimated national land area needed to be ava ilable fo r switchgrass production if different 
switchgrass price levels are going to be met. The authors assume a set switchgrass demand 
function (unspecified in their paper) to do so. Recall that these are national averages, across 
all regions. 
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Table 2: Comparative Land Area For Two Producer Price Levels 
Price Needed land Biofuel Price Needed land Bio fuel 
$35/ton 9.63M acre $50/ton I 7.3M acres 86.9M tons 
To achieve a switchgrass price of $35/ton, they estimate a total of 49.5 million tons of 
biofuel feedstock will be needed, which will nece sitate a land comm itment of approximately 
9.63 million acres. At $50/ton, the necessary land commitment would rise to 17.3 million 
acres producing 86.9 million tons of biofuel feedstock. Note that both of these scenarios 
work out to an average yield of lightly over fi ve tons/acre, regard le of swi tchgrass price 
level. 
Conclu ions 
The empirical papers by Walsh and McLaughlin offer unique insight into U.S. 
biomass projects. Both provide estimates of switchgrass production costs. Interestingly 
enough, they also calculate the production level the switchgrass producers would have to 
reach in order to reach various switchgras market price levels. They are excellent re ources 
for u c in comparison of results across different bioenergy projects. 
Switchgrass Adoption 
ln addition to estimating switchgrass production costs and market prices, it is 
important to sec how farmers decide whether or not to initially plant switchgrass production. 
Hipple et al interviewed fanners in the Chariton Valley area to determine what fac tors 
contributed most significantly in their swi tchgra s adoption decision. Interviews were 
conducted with farmers who grew switchgrass and as well as with those who did not. 
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Farmers' Motivations for Adoption of Switch grass (Hipple et al 2002) 
The Hipple study used a random sample of fifty two farmers-forty-seven men and 
five women-in the Chariton Valley area. The study used an ethnographic survey of 
fa rmers' individual beliefs and values regarding switchgrass production. Some of the 
farmers sampled were already switch grass producers while some were not. Some of the 
farmers not currently producing switchgrass were interested in learning more about 
production and how to get involved, while some expressed no interest at all. Extensive 
interviews were conducted with all participants. 
Many of the farmers interviewed sa id they initially adopted switchgrass through the 
persuasive recommendations of other switcbgrass farmers. Word of mouth was a strong 
initiator, especially from another local producer. Chariton Valley fam1ers were seen to have 
a high degree of trust for the ideas and projects of other locals. 
The author also observed barriers that either stand in the way of switchgrass adoption 
or play a role in a farmer 's decision to adopt. One of the primary barriers is the cultural 
individualism common to the area. Southern Iowa farmers are described as being very set in 
thei r ways and reluctant to consider new or alternative methods of farming. They may be 
more resistant to adopting switcbgrass production because it would represent a departure 
from their current farming routine. A farmer speaking on behalf of Prairi e Lands, the 
Chariton Valley farmers' switchgrass cooperative, also referred to their farmers' preference, 
stati ng that they like keeping things "as they've always been'', with tradition for trad ition's 
sake being important to them. 
Also, the farmers in the Chariton Valley farm land known to be some of the most 
agro nomica ll y cha llenging in the state. This can add to their preference fo r leaving the land 
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as it is. A significant portion of Chariton Valley farmland is al ready enrolled in the CRP. 
They may be less willing to try someth ing new on this land because they feel the land is 
already of questionable crop value. Switchgrass adoption would pose a risk and they may 
prefer to not to take a gamble. They may place a higher va lue on the guaranteed income of 
ei ther a CRP payment or a traditional row crop harvest wi th the reassurance of government 
support payments. 
On the other hand, for farmers who have chosen to adopt swirchgrass, a major 
incentive they had for doing so initially wa the valuable wildlife habitat it offered. Many 
farmers took advantage of the prime hunting cover swi tchgrass provides. At least one fan11er 
interviewed spoke of being paid for leasing the land to an outside corporation for hunting 
purposes. Others interviewed took advantage of switchgrass' effectiveness as CRP cover and 
controlling soil eros ion, in addition to being interested in raising it as an actual bioenergy 
feedstock and participating in the Chariton Val ley biomass project. 
Summary of Hipple et al findings 
Hipple et al report that overall , profitability and long-term sustainability tended to be 
the fir t consideration for most farmers contemplating switchgrass adoption. They want to 
feel certain they will make a return on the ir investment, and that it wi ll continue to be 
profitable to raise switchgrass. They also want to be sure switchgrass production fi ts in with 
their overall farm ing operation and that they fee l comfo11able with assuming any additional 
economic ri sk that comes with swi tchgrass adoption. 
In addition to profitabil ity, the authors fou nd many other motivators for switchgrass 
adoption. While not monetary, they still played a ignificant role in their general decision 
process. Many fanners wi ll weigh the decision again t their own social beliefs and values. 
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They look to see how adoption reflects their feelings on the env ironment, on land 
stewardship, and on their own mission in life. They examine whether or not they fee l like 
there is a true need for the production of the crop, and if it is fu lfilli ng an important purpose 
by being produced. They could a lso consider how switchgrass production affects their local 
communi ty and the rural economy. Most fa rmers interviewed stated that all of these 
questions influenced their decision-making processes in different ways. They all vary in 
relative importance over time and are considered as a who le, weighing the relative 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The Hipple et al study provides an excellent study of what motivates a fa rmer's 
consideration of switchgrass adoption. Though profitabi lity is a primary consideration in 
their decision, farmers seem very likely to take into account other more intangible 
considerations as well . Understanding what influences a switchgrass adoption decision is 
crucial to understanding how to make the decision a more advantageous one for farmers. 
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CHAPTER 3. CHARITON VALLEY BIOMA PROJECT 
The C hariton Va lley Biomass Project is a switchgrass research venture partially 
funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. The project i located in outhem Iowa in 
Appanoose, Decatur, Lucas and Wayne counties. Its primary goa l is to" ... demonstrate 
biomass (switchgrass) and coal cofiring technology with a vision of developing markets for 
energy crops in southern Iowa." (Chariton Valley Peer Review 2003) Essentially, 
researchers wi h to determine if and under what conditions it would be feasible for local 
farmers in the Chariton Valley area to raise and sell switchgrass commercially as an 
a lternative energy crop. The project is currently over een by the Chari ton Valley Resource 
Conservation and Deve lopment office in Centerville, Iowa. It has also brought together the 
formation of a loca l switchgrass farmers' cooperative group, Prairie Lands, Inc. , as well a a 
team of over a dozen both public and private resea rch groups. 
The Ottumwa Generating Station located in Chillicothe, Iowa, is the Iowa power 
plant participating in this pilot research. It is owned by Alliant Energy® and is the third 
largest generating station in the state. The plant could use switchgrass as a substitute for up 
to five percent of the coal used. At commercialization, the project could invo lve up to 500 
C hariton Valley farmers as producers and uti lize up to 200,000 tons of switchgrass per year 
rai sed on an estimated 50,000 acres of land (Anta res 2002). Switchgrass could generate 35 
MW of power at the Alliant plant when burned at the 5% co-fire rate (Hipple 2002). 
A two week test burn was successfull y completed by Alliant in December 2003. A 
econd, longer test bum is scheduled for the winter of 2005-2006. 
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CHAPTER 4. SWITCHGRASS COSTS OF PRODUCTION 
Switchgrass Description 
When the Oak Ridge National Laboratory began researching potenti al bioenergy 
feedstocks in 1978, they were looking for crop species that would encapsulate many different 
characteristics. A good feedstock would have relatively high energy production potential and 
low ash content when burned. It would also be high-yielding, fast-growing and resilient in a 
variety of different growing environments. After extensive testing of more than 30 different 
herbaceous crop species throughout the l 980 's, researchers selected switchgrass 
(McLaughlin 1999). 
ln addition to having all the desired attributes, thi s perenn ial grass crop was easily 
adaptable to conventional fanning practices and offered many additional beneficial 
envi ronmental and conservation characteristics. One of switcbgrass ' greatest assets is its 
deep root system, which can reach over ten feet deep. This root system creates improved soil 
water infi ltration and gives it greater capacity to hold nutrients and sequester carbon. It also 
allows swi tchgrass to serve as a superior protector against soil erosion, a problem that can 
p lague fanners growing traditiona l annual cash crops without such permanent root systems. 
Above ground, switcbgrass fields serve as excellent habitat fo r a wide variety of wildlife, 
providing both borne environments and protecti ve cover (Bransby 2002). 
Switchgrass is a very low-maintenance perennial crop, requiring less chemical 
application than traditional row crops. In the establishment year, farmers plant switchgrass 
from February to March for frost seeding, or mid-April to late May for spring seeding. No 
nitrogen is used in the first yea r to allow the swi tchgrass a better opportunity for finner 
establishment (weeds are especially harmfu l in tbjs first year when the stand is taking fast 
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hold). Also in the first year there is no harvest taken to a llow the stand to take root. Aside 
from the probability of a potential reseed in the second year to strengthen the stand, no 
reseeding is necessary. 
Once the stand enters standard yea rly production, only ferti lizer and herbicide 
app lications are needed. The stand will reach two-thirds of its potentia l height in its second 
year, and is considered fully developed by its third . Swilchgrass harvest begins in the second 
year and can be done usi ng standard hay harvesting methods-mowing, raking and baling the 
grass for col lection (Teel et al, 2003 (a) and (b)). 
Al l of the above characteristics allowed switch grass to be se lected as the bioenergy 
crop with the most potential for commercia l success . More detailed discussion of 
switchgrass and its agronomic and environmental attributes can be found in Mc Laugh lin, 
Bransby, and Burras. Specific producti on descriptions used in this analysis can be found in 
Appendices A and B. 
Estimating Switch grass Costs of Production 
Budget projections for switcbgrass production are broken down into three different 
stages: the initial establ ishment costs, the projected reseeding costs, and the annual standard 
production co ts. Establishment costs include the pre-seeding machinery costs (disking, 
harrowing, mowing, etc.), seed costs and any chemica ls/fertili zers used. Jn some cases the 
switchgrass stand may not establi sh or wi ll establi sh too thin. Reseeding co ts wi ll factor in 
the probability that a fi eld w ill need to be reseeded and wi ll inc lude any equ ipment and 
additio nal seed and chemical/fe11ilizer needed to do o. Final ly, the annual production co t 
represent the typical yearly co ts for machinery, chemical and fertilizers, and harve t costs. 
18 
Costs are calcu lated both on a per-ton, as well as a per-acre basis. Each of these three 
production budget stages will be di scussed in more detail in following sections. 
General Budget Assumptions 
All machinery/equipment costs are from Duffy et al (2004). Labor use estimates are 
derived from Hanna (2001 ). Both of tbese represent the most up-to-date cost estimations 
available for the C hariton Valley region. In the case o f machinery costs, both the power unit 
and implement charge are included, as are both fixed and variable costs. A 6.0% 
amortization factor and a 7.0% interest rate on any operating expenses are used in the 
calculations. In addition, a frost seeding scenario is assumed. As noted, switchgrass can also 
be seeded in the spring, but frost seeding is the dominant seeding method. The swi tchgrass 
average stand life is assumed to be ten years. A wage rate of$ IO/hour is assumed for all 
labor. 
Due to differing land rent charges switchgrass costs were estimated assuming 
production on both cropland as well as grassland. Different land charges were used to reflect 
this distinction. Cropland rent was assumed to be $98/acre and grassland, $55/acre. These 
values are based on farmland rents for the four Chariton Valley counties (Edwards et al 
2004(b )). It is important to note that though an average land charge was used for each of the 
two land types, there is stil l land heterogeneity wi thin each type. That is, w ithin each land 
type a given acre could have varying productive potentia l using the same inputs but given 
different producer ski ll sets or other outs ide variables. 
Additional production assumptions w ill be discussed in the ir appropriate sections. 
Appendices A and B provide a complete breakdown of calculated costs for each section. 
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Establishment Year: Year 1 
Table 3 shows the estimated switchgrass establishment year costs for both cropland 
and grassland, respectively. ln tbe establi shment year, equipment is needed for land 
preparation, planting, and ferti lizing/spraying. Ten lbs. of pure live seed (PLS) are used (cost 
estimates are based on the usage of the Iowa Cave-Jn-Rock seed variety), and standard 
app li cation of fertilizers (N, P and K), chemicals (atrazine, 2,4-D and Roundup®), and lime 
is assumed (see tables). The switcbgrass is not harvested in its inaugural year because it is 
not hardy enough to do so (the assumed ten-year stand life does not begin until the following 
year, the first year of a llowed harvest). The costs are ca lculated on both a per-acre and per-
ton basis, and then are prorated using a default 6.0% amortization factor for eleven years. 
The costs can then be evenly distributed forward to each of the subsequent ten production 
years. A detailed budget breakdown of the costs found in Table 3 can be found in 
Appendices A and B. 
Table 3: Switchgrass Establishment Costs ($/ton): 
Land Type 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
Cropland $15.15 $7.57 $5.05 $3.79 $3.03 
Grass land $ 14.00 $7.00 $4.67 $3.50 $2.80 
Reseeding Costs: Year 2: 
Table 4 shows the estimated reseeding costs of a switchgrass stand for cropland and 
grassland, respectively. Reseeding occurs when the full seeding from the establishment year 
does not fully establish. It is not always necessary to reseed, so thi s cost is adjusted by the 
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expected probability that a reseeding becomes necessary (Teel et al , 2003(b)). The 
ca lcu lation done here assumes a defau lt reseed probability of 25%. 
Reseed costs must also include the add itional P LS needed (7 lbs.), as well as the 
associated planting/sprayi ng machinery, and the standard ferti lizer and herb icides (no land 
preparation is necessary) and here as with the establishment year there is no switchgrass 
harve t). The tota ls are then multiplied by the reseed probability factor to determine an 
appropriate expected cost value. The total cost value is agai n prorated at a default value of 
6.0%, this time at ten years out to determine the reseed cost per year. 
Table 4: witchgrass Reseeding Cost ($/ton): 
Land Type 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ron/acre 8 to.n/acre I 0 ton/acre 
Cropland $2.96 $ 1.48 $0.99 $0.74 $0.59 
Grass land $2.23 $ 1.11 $0.74 $0.56 $0.45 
Annua l Production Costs: 
Table 5 illustrates the estimated annua l production costs fo r cropland and grass land, 
respectively. Switchgrass receives an nual fertilizers (N, P and K) and is treated with 
herbicides (atrazine, 2,4-0). The costs of the e chemicals as well as the machinery to apply 
them are inc luded in the budget. Interest on production operating expenses is set at a default 
7.0%. Note that, per standard practice, the amount of fertilizer application wil l vary with 
yield due to diffe rent P&K removal rates. All annual harvest costs are also included in these 
estimations. Square ba les are assumed, each weighing approximately 950 lb . 
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Table 5: Switchgrass Yearly Production Costs ($/ton) 
Land Type 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre I 0 ton/acre 
Cropland $90.05 $52.54 $40.04 $33.79 $30.04 
Grassland $68.55 $4 1.79 $32.87 $28.4 1 $25.74 
Finally, staging and loading costs are considered. A hay wagon is assumed to haul 
the staged bales from the fi e ld to the farm. The cost estimate is ca lculated to include the hay 
wagon carrying the staged bales from points of collection in the fi eld back to tbe fa rmstead, 
and then returning to the fi e ld fo r another pickup. Note that cost estimates for bali ng, as well 
as staging and loading, are calculated on a per-ton basis, indicating that overall harvest costs 
will also be a function of yield (See Appendices A and 8). 
Total Production Costs: 
Combining the prorated establishment and reseed costs with the standard annual 
production costs yie lds the tota l estimated production costs for switchgrass grown on both 
cropland and grassland. See Table 6 fo r a breakdown. As can be seen, total costs wi ll vary 
substantia lly depending on switchgrass yield. 
Table 6: Total Annual Switchgrass Production Costs ($/ton) 
Land T ype 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
Cropland $ 108. 15 $6 1.59 $46.07 $38.31 $33.66 
Grassland $84.77 $49.90 $38.27 $32.47 $28.98 
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Average switchgrass yield in Chari ton Valley is currentl y approx imately 2-3 ton /acre. 
Four tons/acre is what has been deemed to be expected out of the current growing conditions 
and seed culti va rs. With continued research, the hope is to boost thi s yield c loser to s ix 
tons/acre (Brummer 2004). 
cnsitivi ty Ana lysis (Yearly Production Costs): 
Yield: 
Yield has the most significant impact on total production costs. Tota l production 
costs as a function of yield are represented in Table 6 for cropland and grassland, 
respectively, and are illustrated in Figure I. At the lowest yield levels, even a small increa e 
in yield has a dramatic impact. As yie ld improves, thi s affect is dampened as diminishing 
marginal returns set in . B y the time a producer reaches the highest yield levels, total costs 
have leveled out. Establishment and reseed costs have been spread over a larger yield and 
onl y annua l harvest costs (as a porti on of annual production costs) continue to accumulate for 
each ton. A a result, each add itional ton produced yields less of a marginal cost per ton 
reduction . See Figure l. 
impact: 
This re ult has both adva ntage and di advantages from a producer's perspective. To 
illustrate this, examine the case of Chariton Valley producers. Any increase in yield they can 
achieve will dramaticall y improve their proj ected cost outlook. For the Chariton Valley 
fi elds, fo ur tons/acre on average is thought to be an achievable switchgrass yield (based on 
so il type, topography, breeding, etc.) (Brummer 2004). For producers not consistently 
matching that yield, improvi ng yie lds even by one ton/acre wil l a llow significant reductions 
in their per-ton production costs. 
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Continued agronomic research can help producers towards this goal, as researchers 
work to improve yield performance through better selecti ve breeding, etc. Over time, 
researchers hope to have the abi lity to boost average yields up to s ix tons/acre fo r the area. 
But producers indiv idually can also have an effect on their yields through improved 
production management practices they can easily take on themselves (Brummer 2004). 
On the other band, at those same 2-3 tons/acre yield levels, any yield decrease can 
bring about a simi larly dramatic effect, but a less desirable one. Producers are more 
economically susceptible to yield variations and shifts at lower yield levels, and even small 
yield decreases will increase costs of production significantly. The lower the yield the 
producer is averaging, the larger the production cost increase will be if his yields drop. With 
seasonal unce1tainties- temperature, rainfall , etc.- always being a producer concern (even 




The land charge also bas a s ignificant impact on total production costs. Table 7 
shows the effect of varying land charge, ranging from $0 to $150/acre. Within each yie ld 
level , total production cost adjusts noticeably as a function of the charge. As yie lds increase, 
the effects diminishes somewhat, but at the low-to-middle yields where current Chariton 
Valley production levels are falling, the land charge does make a difference. 
Table 7: Variance in Land Charge 
Land Charge 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
$0/acre $5 1.27 $33. 15 )27. 11 $24.09 $22.28 
$50/acre $80.29 $47.66 $36.79 $3 l.35 $28.08 
$75/acre $94.80 $54.92 $4 1.62 $34.97 $30.99 
$100/acre $109.31 $62. 17 $46.46 $38.60 $33.9 
$125/acre $ 123.82 $69.43 $5 1.29 $42.23 $36.79 
$ 150/acre $138.33 $76.68 $56.1 3 $45.86 $39.69 
impact: 
Producers can expect to have some level of control over their land charge. By 
choosing acres to plant as switcbgrass that have a lower land charge, producers can lower 
thei r production costs. But in doing thi s they may face a trade-off. Farmland prices derive 
much of their appraised va lue from productivity indicators such as soil type, propensity for 
eros ion, general topography, etc. Choosing to plant swi tchgrass on low-valued fields would 
save them money in land charges, but the less productive land could keep yield low as well. 
Conversely, more productive land with a higher assoc iated land charge wi ll be more 
25 
expensive but has the potential to generate higher yields. Choosing what land to devote to 
switchgrass production is a key tradeoff deci sion that producers must make. It wi ll be up to 
each individual producer to eva luate and balance these two variab les so as to have the best 
affect on their individual production costs. 
It is al so important to note that land charges in general have been s ignificantly rising 
in recent years. Land is becoming increasingly valuable, and farm land prices and rental rates 
reflect this. Switchgrass production budget estimates for Chariton Valley generated 
previously in 2003 were revised in 2004, with the major change being in the estimated 
average land rent charge. Cropland especially appreciated in average rent charge. The 
average cropland rental for the four Chariton Valley counties was adjusted upward from 
$75/acre to $98/acre, and average grassland rental from $50/acre to $55/acre during that time 
frame. These increases show that though producers wi ll always retain control over choosing 
which land they devote to switchgrass production, changes in land charges will still affect 
their total achievable production costs. 
Table 7 shows the comparison bet\.veen the varying yield levels at both $75/acre and 
$ I 00/acre. This g ives a good idea of what such an increase will do to total production costs. 
At two tons/acre yield, production costs ri se from $94.80/ton to $109.3 1/ton with the land 
charge increase. At a higher yield of six tons/acre, the increase is smaller, from $41.62/ton to 
$46.46/ton . This illustrates that when choosing land for switchgrass production and 
weighing the tradeoff between choosing highly producti ve land or land with a low rent 
charge, the land charge a producer can manage wil l need to remain a carefull y and 
individual ly evaluated cost. 
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Additional Variables: 
In addition to yield level and land charge, other potentially influential variab les were 
tested for their impact on tota l production costs on both cropland and grassland. Wage rate, 
amortization rate, seed costs, and reseed probability changes were all examined. The results 
of these estimations are shown in Tables 8 through 15. None of the variables create a 
significant cost difference. The high cost impact is still seen between yield levels, and within 
those levels the tested variables' effects were minor. 
Table 8: Variance in Wage Rate on Cropland 
Wage Rate 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
$6.00/hr $ 106.53 $60.43 $45.06 $37.37 $32.76 
$8.00/her $107.34 $6 1.0 I $45.56 $37.84 $33 .2 1 
$10.00/hr $ 108. 15 $6 1.59 $46.07 $38.3 1 $33.66 
$12.00/hr $108.96 $62. 17 $46.58 $38.78 $34.J 0 
$14.00/hr $ 109.77 5>62.76 $47.09 $39.25 $34.55 
Table 9: Variance in Wage Rate on Grassland 
Wage Rate 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
$6.00/hr $83. 15 $48.73 $37.26 $3 1.53 $28.09 
$8.00/her $83.96 $49.32 $37.77 $32.00 $28.53 
$ 10.00/hr $84.77 $49.90 $38.28 $32.47 $28.98 
$12.00/hr $85.59 $50.49 $38.79 $32.94 $29.43 
$14.00/hr $86.40 $5 1.07 $39.30 $33.4 1 5>29.88 
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Table 10: Variance in Amortization Rate on Cropland 
Arnort. Rate 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre l 0 ton/acre 
4.00% $106.36 $60.70 $45.48 $37.87 $33.10 
6.00% $ 108. 15 $61.59 $46.07 $38.3 1 $33.66 
8.00% $ 110.02 $62.53 $46.70 $38 .78 $34.03 
10.00% $ 111.98 $63.5 1 $47.35 $39.27 $34.42 
Table 11: Variance in Amortization Rate on Grassland 
Amott. Rate 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre I 0 ton/acre 
4.00% $83. 17 $49. 10 $37.75 $32.07 $28.6 
6.00% $84.77 $49.90 $38.28 $32.47 $28.98 
8.00% $86.46 $50.74 $38.84 $32.89 $29.32 
10.00% $88.2 1 $5 1.62 $39.43 $33.33 $29.67 
Table 12: Variance in Seed Cost on Cropland 
Cost ($/lb.) 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
$5.00 $ 106.64 $60.84 $45.57 $37.94 $33.35 
$6.00 $107.40 $6 1.2 1 $45.82 $38. 12 $33.51 
$7.00 $ 108. 15 $61.59 $46.07 $38.3 1 $33.66 
$8.00 $ 108.90 $6 1.97 $46.32 $38.50 $33.8 1 
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Table 13: Variance in Seed Cost on Grassland 
Cost ($/lb.) 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/ acre I 0 ton/acre 
$5.00 $83.27 $49. 15 $37.78 $32.09 $28.68 
$6.00 $84.02 $49.53 $38.03 $32.28 $28.83 
$7.00 $84.77 $9.90 $38.28 $32.47 $28.98 
$8.00 $85.53 $50.28 $38.53 $32.66 $29. 13 
Table 14: Variance in Reseed Probability on Cropland 
Probability 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
0% $ 105. 19 $60. 11 $45.09 $37.57 $33.06 
10% $106.37 $60.70 $45.48 $37.87 $33.30 
25% $108. 15 $6 1.59 $46.07 $38.3 I $33.66 
35% $ 109.33 $62. 18 $46.47 $38.6 1 $33.89 
50% $111.1 0 $63.07 $47.06 $39.05 $34.25 
Table 15: Variance in Reseed Probability on Grassland 
Probability 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
0% $82.55 $48.79 $37.54 $3 1.9 J $28.54 
10% $83.44 $49.24 $37.83 $32. 13 $28.7 1 
25% 84.77 $49.90 $38.28 $32.47 $28.98 
35% $85.66 $50.35 $38.58 $32.69 $29.16 
50% $87.00 $5 1.02 $39.02 $33.02 $29.43 
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Switchgrass Storage Costs 
Production costs thus far have included only actual fi eld production of the 
switchgrass itself. Logistically after the switchgrass is harvested, producers must still store 
tbe switchgrass bales until they can be transported from their farms to the power plant. 
When utilized as an energy feedstock, switchgrass is optimally harvested only once per year. 
The power plant, however, would be co-firin g the switchgrass bales year-round. They would 
need a steady, regularl y-scheduled supply of bales, mean ing that producers would need a 
location for storing the bales before they are hauled to the plant. 
If the power plant is willing to provide storage for the ba les on-site at the plant, 
producers would not need to factor storage costs into their own production costs. Most likely, 
however, thi s will not be the case. The plant is assumed to be more likely to leave bale 
storage to the producers. Producers are assumed to pay fo r the ir own bale storage. For these 
estimations, it is assumed that farmers would deliver switchgrass bales directly to the power 
plant without having to store them long-term on-farm only during harvest season. The rest of 
the year they would require a place to store the remaining bales until their future de livery. 
Many options are available fo r switchgrass bale storage, all varying in price and their 
potential for protective cover. Infonn ation on various storage options available and their 
associated potential dry matter loss (the effectiveness of the strncture at keeping the bales 
free of moisture) was available through previous Chari ton Valley research (Brummer et al 
2002). They are presented in Table 16. For more detailed descriptions of these storage 
scenarios, see Brummer et al 2002. 
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Table 16: Switchgrass Storage Scenarios 
Storage Scenario Dry Matter Loss (DML) % 
Outside, unprotected on crushed rock 15% 
Reusable tarp on crushed rock 7% 
Open-sided pole frame structure on rock 4% 
Hoop barn 4% 
Enclosed pole frame structure on rock 2% 
Pre-manufactured steel storage shed 2% 
Recall that during the harvest season, producers have the opportunity to deliver 
switchgrass bales directly to the power plant which eliminates the need for more long-term, 
off-s ite storage. As a result, it is assumed that the switchgrass storage scenarios seen here 
would not have to house all the harvested bales year-round. A switchgrass harvest season 
can last for approximate ly two months. Therefore, it is assumed that the selected storage 
structure would be used for holding switch grass bales ten out of tbe twelve months per year. 
This generates the assumption that roughl y 82% of tbe total amount of switchgrass harvested 
in a year would require off-field storage. 
In order to calculate the net cost of tbe above scenarios, tbe "actual" cost of each 
storage structure must be adjusted to reflect tbe additional cost incurred by factoring in its 
DML. This is achieved by taking the percentage of the switchgrass market price that is 
associated with the storage structure 's DML and adding it back into the storage structure's 
cost (represented under the "Cost with DML" heading in Table 17). The adjustment 
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essentially becomes an added cost representing the loss of quali ty incurred. An additional 
assumption is made, that switchgrass ' initial market price (before the DML loss is factored in) 
is set at $50/ton. The total project cost is multipli ed by 82% to reflect the estimated storage 
occurrence (for ten out of twe lve months per year), which then yields the final structural 
project cost. The calculated storage costs for all storage structures can be fo und in Table 17. 
Table 17: Estimated Switchgrass Storage Costs 
Storage Cost without DML(%) DML @ Cost w/ Project Cost 
DML ($/ton) $50/ton DML ($/ton) ($/ton) 
Hoop Barn $5.35 4 $2.00 $7 .55 $6. 19 
Tarp $5.03 7 $3.50 $8.53 $6.99 
Unprotected $ 1.07 15 $7.50 $8.57 $7.03 
Open Po le $6.62 4 $2.00 $8.62 $7.07 
Closed Po le $ 13.24 2 $ 1.00 $ 14.24 $ 11.68 
Steel Shed $ 16. 10 2 $ 1.00 $ 17. 10 $ 14.02 
Transportation 
The estimation of transportation costs is based on an estimation done in Brummer, et 
al (2002) . In this estimation, transportation costs include the cost of moving switchgrass 
bales from the producer 's on-fann storage faci lity to the deli very s ite at the power plant 
(transportation of the bales from the harvest fie ld to the farmstead is covered in the harvest 
costs w ithin the annual production budget). The estimate assumes a driver and a standard 
truck/semi-trailer to haul the bales . 
The average travel di stance to the power plant is estimated at 40 miles or 80 miles 
roundtrip, representing the average distance of a Chariton Valley producer farm from the 
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Ottumwa Generating Station in Chi llicothe. A standard semi-trailer truck capable of 
carrying approximately 18 tons of switchgrass is assumed. This translates to approximately 
38 total switchgrass bales with each bale weighing 950 lbs. The driver's labor is valued at 
$ 12/hour. His wait time during the loading of the truck on-fann and the unloading of the 
ba les at the power plant is estimated to be forty-five minutes each time, or ninety minutes for 
the total trip (Brummer et al 2002). 
To estimate the cost of moving a truckload of switcbgrass per mile, Edwards et al 
(2004(a)) was used. Edwards et al reported an average of$ l.75/truckload/miJe, within a 
projected range of$ l.00 to $2.25/truckload/mile, for moving round bales by truck (a close 
estimate to this square bale scenario). In this calculation, $1.90/truckload/mile was used (due 
to the potential of fluctuating energy costs, it was thought to estimate high within the given 
range). The calculation can be seen in the fol lowing steps: 
$1.90/truckload/mile * 80 miles = $/ 521/oad or $8.44/ton (2) 
$/ 2/hour * 1.5 driver labor hours= $181/oad or $ / /ton (3) 
$8.44/ton + $1/ton = $9.44/ton (4) 
Total Delivered Switchgrass Costs 
Combining the tota l switchgrass production costs with the selected storage and 
transportation scenario costs produces an estimate of the total delivered costs associated witb 
switchgrass production. The estimations found in Tables 18 and 19 (cropland in Table 18 
and grassland in Table I 9) represent the cost of producing switchgrass from the first 
establishment planting through to the delivery of the swi tchgrass bales to the power plant 
door. 
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Table 18: witchgrass Total Delivered Co ts for Cropland 
Tota l 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre 10 ton/acre 
Delivered 
Cost 
Production $108.15 $6 1.59 $46.07 $38.3 1 $33.36 
Cost 
Storage $6. 19 $6. 19 $6. 19 $6. 19 $6. 19 
Transport $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 
Total $123.78 $77.22 61.70 $53.94 $49.29 
($/ton) 
Table 19: witchgrass Total Delivered Co ts for Grassland 
Tota l 2 ton/acre 4 ton/acre 6 ton/acre 8 ton/acre I 0 ton/acre 
Delivered 
Cost 
Production $84.77 $49.90 $38.28 $32.47 $28.98 
Cost 
Storage $6. 19 $6. 19 $6.19 $6.19 $6. 19 
Transport $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 $9.44 
Total $100.40 $65.53 $53.98 $48.10 $44.61 
($/ton) 
Production Cost Conclusions 
Tota l deli vered switchgrass costs for both cropland and grass land wi ll vary widely as 
a function of yie ld. This result emphasizes the impo1iance of yield on production costs. 
Yields, and the cost differences assoc iated with them, wi ll make a s ignificant difference in 
whether or not switchgrass can be a commercia ll y competitive bioenergy crop. It is the 
primary variable for producers and researchers to address. Continued agronomic research 
can serve an excellent purpose in breeding higher-yielding cultivars. Improved producer 
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management techniques w ill be important too. They can be used in both the short and long 
term as rel ati ve ly easy w ays to improve yield . Even minimal gains of on ly one ton/acre or 
sma ller drasticall y affect the deliverable cost/ton. 
The importance of yield also ties in to the importance of land charges and how they 
relate to the overa ll costs of production. Table 7 showed how production costs can be 
significantl y affected by varying land charges. Jn addition, land charges can be an indicator 
to rh e productive potenti al of the land. High-priced fa rmland tends to be high-qua lity 
fa rmland, with the potentia l to produce higher yields. Switchgrass producers wanting to 
generate high yie lds to keep producti on costs low wi ll have to detennine w hat land i go ing 
to give them the highest yield potential at the lowest cost. Land selection is thus a key 
decis ion for producers, and must be made on an ind ividual level. 
It is a lso worth noting how the total deli verab le cost of switchgrass is dominated by 
the actua l production costs. ln Tables 18 and 19, at two tons/acre yie ld, production costs 
total $ 108. 15/ton and S84.77/ ton on cropland and grass land respecti vely. Storage and 
transportation costs combined total on ly $ 15.63/ton in compari son. Between both scenarios, 
the productio n costs are approx imately 5% of the total deli verable cost. This percentage 
improves as yield improves and producti on co ts/ton come down, but even at higher yields 
production costs rema in nomina ll y higher. This remains true even afte r accounting for the 
effect that ris ing energy costs could have on transportation costs. Thi s offers fu rther support 
to the knowledge that actual production it e lf- through yield, etc .- is where the rea l 
production cost gains can be made. 
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CHAPTER 5. ADORES ING THE HIGHE R COST OF S\ VITCHGRASS 
PRODUCTION 
Coal is one of the U nited tates' most common energy sources. ln the year 2000, the 
use of coal accounted for 32% of total energy production in the U.S. and over 92% of the 
coal consumed went to electricity generation (DOE A ER 2000). One of the reasons for its 
popularity is that coa l is a very inexpens ive feedstock. It is the cheapest of the fossil fuel s, 
making it the most common feedstock in most U.S. power plants. A reasonable estimate of 
the cost of coal today would be approximate ly $ 16/ ton (the average annual free-on-board 
cost of bituminous and sub-bituminous coal prices from 2001-2003 from the Energy 
Information Administration/U.S. DOE's coal price database). 
For switchgrass to be commercially successful as a coal ubsti tute, it must be able to 
compete w ith coa l's low cost. Power plants wi ll genera lly act as cost minimizers, choosing 
the raw fuel source that will give them the greatest Btu value at the lowest pos ib le cost. 
Coal becomes their best feedstock choice in this context. Even in the most optimal scenario 
of budgetary assumptions- a low land charge, high yie lds, low input charges, etc.- the best 
switchgrass costs of production projection are still going to signi ficantl y exceed the cost of 
coal on a per ton bas is. Refer to Tables 18 and 19 in the previous chapter to compare. At 
two and fo ur tons/acre yields-currently attainab le leve ls- switchgrass production costs are 
$ 100.40/ton and $65.53/ton, respectively. 
For w itchgrass to be a commercially competi ti ve coal a lternati ve, it will need to 
effectively compete wi th its price. The key question becomes how best to address the 
varying cost difference between the cost of switch grass on deli very and the cost of coal. 
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Addressing the higher cost of switchgrass production 
Three options exist to make switchgrass more competiti ve with coal. The first, most 
obv ious option would be to work to s imply lower farrners ' costs of production. Methods of 
approaching this were discussed in the previous chapter. Though they are considered to be 
an effective way of controlling costs, further development of the methods are considered 
beyond the scope of this research and will not be considered further. 
A second option available for consideration would be fo r the government to tax 
and/or regulate the negati ve environmental externa lities brought about by mining and 
burning of coal. Strip-mining coal- the most common type of coal mining- is very hard on 
the so il. Affected soils become very acidic and struggle to support plant growth. Strip-
mi n i ng also depletes wildl ife habitats and can cause serious groundwater contamination by 
leaching harmful pollutants into the ground (U.S. Nuclear Regulato ry Commiss ion 2004). 
The harmful environmental and health effects from ai r pollution stemming from 
burning coal are also widely known. Acid deposition caused by the release of sulfur oxides 
and nitrogen oxides into the air is directly attributable to the coal-burning process. The 
sulfuric and nitric acids formed when these the two gases then mix with water can cause 
serious ecological problems by damaging aquatic ecosystems, negatively affecting soil pH 
and growing vegetation, etc. Burning coal also creates negative human health effects by 
producing smog, a mixture of harrnful air pollutants principally made up of ground-level 
ozone. The air poll utants released from combustion sources Ji ke coal-burning power plants 
react with sunlight to create ozone, which then becomes trapped in the atmosphere. 
Regularly breathing high doses of smog can lead to serious respi ratory a ilments, including 
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reduced lung function and increased occurrence of asthma. These ailments especially affect 
young children (U.S. EPA Air Quality Bureau 2000). 
Coal would become a relatively more expensive feedstock if the coal-mining industry 
and coal-burning power plants were forced to internalize the externa l environmental costs 
that coal generates. Effective and efficient ways of doing so-through taxes or other 
financial regulation of the coal industry-have been studied at length. It is an important 
option to address, but for this research purpose it wi ll not be considered further. 
A third option ex ists to help mitigate the costs associated with coal use and encourage 
the use of switchgrass. Just as the negative externali ties of coal could be incorporated into its 
cost, the positive environmental externalities from both the production and use of switchgrass 
could be factored into its cost as well. There are incentive opportunities in existence that 
could prove to be adaptab le for this purpose. Using them as switchgrass incentives provides 
an interesting way of indirectly subsidizing c lean bioenergy production. It is on thi s option 
that the remainder of this thesis is focused. 
Environmental Benefits of Switchgrass 
Switchgrass, either as a vegetative crop or an energy feedstock, offers a variety of 
environmental benefits. It is a sturdy, warm-season pere1mial grass native to much of the 
Midwest. It has the ability to adapt to a wide variety of growing conditions, from 
exceptionally dry to almost marsh-like conditions. A switchgrass stand is easi ly adaptable to 
commercial farming, and its presence develops an exce llent soil quality. For producers 
cultivating a stand over time, it offers all the benefits of a traditionally estab li shed grass. 
Because it is a tall prairie grass, it makes an excellent wi ldli fe sanctuary. It has a deep, 
complex root system that is a superior guard against soil erosion- some stands have been 
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shown to have roots greater than three and a half meters in depth (McLaughl in l 999). It can 
also act as a filter for runoff chemicals before those chemicals reach nearby waterways. 
As an energy feedstock, it bas been shown to be one of the best of the high yielding 
perennials grasses to use as a biofuel. It offers excellent, effi cient burning and energy-
generating capabilities. Burning switchgrass produces far less net carbon dioxide emiss ions 
and can bring about a reduction in sulfur and nitrogen oxide gases. It is estimated that 
burning 200,000 tons of switchgrass per year (the commercial goa l amount set for the 
Chariton Valley project) would re lease roughly 500,000 less tons of carbon d ioxide per year 
(Antares 2002). In addition, pre liminary results from the Chari ton Valley test burn in 2003 
indicated drops in both sulfur and ni trogen oxide gases during the periods where switchgrass 
was being substituted into the feedstock (Comer 2004). 
If any or all of these positive externalities could be incorporated into the va lue or 
overall cost of switchgrass re lative to coal , it would bring about a more representati ve picture 
of all the costs of burning these individual fuel stocks. The addi tional environmental benefits 
to society by the use of switchgrass adds value to its use. There has been considerable 
discuss ion in economic literature on designing optimal methods of efficiently valuing 
positive externalities and recognizing them in the cost of the good. These discussions 
provided an excellent theoretica l guide. 
Three d ifferent ways of representing the positive externality effect of switchgrass are 
considered. They inc lude a modified CRP payment to producers; a carbon payment made to 
producers by buyers in a carbon market in exchange fo r carbon sequestration; and a green 
payment, paid by consumers to the power plant as a c lean energy premium on their e lectri ci ty 
usage. All three of these will be discussed in the fo llowing chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6. CRP PAYMENTS 
CRP Program 
The Conservation Reserve Program is a land retirement government program 
establ ished as a part of the 1985 Farm Bill. Its purpose was to encourage farmers to idle 
highly erodible land in exchange for an annual rental payment. Farmers would enter into ten-
year government contracts agreeing to set the land aside. With cost-sharing assistance from 
the government they would estab lish permanent vegetative cover on it for protection. 
Farmers were required to absta in from deriving any economic benefit from the contracted 
land while it was enrolled in the program. Contracts that expired at the end of the full ten 
years could be re-enrolled by the farmer (U.S. DOA/CRP 2004, Walsh 1996). 
In 1990, five years after the program was established, CRP was expanded further. In 
addition to including provis ions for erodible farmland, it began establishing contracts for 
environmentally sensitive lands as well. Land providing needed wildlife cover or land 
surrounding sensitive water or watershed areas could now qua lify for CRP sign-up. Contract 
agreements stayed the same- idle land was exchanged for a rental payment. More CRP 
acres were s igned up than ever before as a result of this expansion (Walsh J 996). 
As of Ju ly 2004, there were over 650,000 CRP contracts in the United States 
protecting nearly 35 million total acres of land (U.S. DOA/CRP Signup 2004). The state of 
Iowa had approximately 1.9 mi ll ion of those acres, making it the sixth-largest state in terms 
of number of acres enrolled. The average CRP payment across all of Iowa's 99 counties is 
estimated at $103/acre (U.S. DOA/CRP Signup Statistics 2004). 
Discussion of the CRP program in the 1995 Farm Bill debates in Congress centered 
arou nd methods to reduce the program's costs, estimated at$ J .8 bi llion in 1995 (Walsh 
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1996). A proposed solution was to allow modification of the CRP contracts to grant approval 
for certain speci fi c economic uses. In exchange, farmers would receive a reduced rental 
payment. One of the economic uses discussed was the production and harvest of bioenergy 
crops. More specifically, fa rmers wou ld be allowed to grow bioenergy crops such as 
switchgrass or short rotation woody crops on their CRP land fo r profit. In addition, they 
would continue to receive a reduced portion of their CRP rental payment. 
U ltimately, this proposal was dropped from the final version of the 1995 bi ll. Even 
so, it would have represented a potential win-win situation for both the government and for 
bioenergy farmers. Energy crops tend to come in two major varieties- perennial prairie 
grass and short rotation woody crops, also known as fas t-growing trees. Either of these 
varieti es planted on CRP land sti ll maintain the environmental integrity of the land 
conservation obj ectives the government seeks. Both are sti ll cons idered conservation cover 
by CRP guidelines. The government could be reducing the program's overa ll cost by paying 
reduced CRP payments on bioenergy crop acres by allowing tbem to be harvested. 
Fanners would also have the opportunity to profit. They could receive income from 
the sa le of their crop in addi tion to receiving a continued partia l CRP payment. Additionally, 
in tbe evolving energy marketplace where many renewab le energy market prices are trying to 
become competi tive with regu lar , cheaper foss il fuels, the reduced payment could serve as an 
effective production incentive for bioenergy crop producers. In a very unique way, the 
payment could become a "subsidy" while still reducing the overall amount of existing 
subsidy that the government pays out. ln other words, the government would have a 
production incentive that would essentially save them money. 
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A Modified CRP Payment 
Just how effective could a partial CRP payment be in creating an incentive for Iowa 
fa rmers to take their CRP land and switch over to rais ing switchgrass? The effects of a 
reduced payment on a producer's switchgrass production returns lie in the crop yield/acre 
attained and in the market price of switchgrass. [n the Chariton Valley project area, the 
average CRP payment in the four counties is $74.55 per acre (U.S. DOA/CRP Signup 2004). 
In exchange for their payment, fanners are required only to mow tbe idle land. The 
estimated costs for mowing land in 2004 were $4.37/acre (Duffy et al 2004). Assuming a 
farn1er mows the land twice per year, the cost to them is $8. 74/acre. Taking this out of their 
fu ll payment leaves Chariton Valley farmers an average net CRP income of $65.81 per acre. 
For farmers to consider raising switchgrass, it is assumed they would have to be ab le 
to make at least as much net income from its sale as they would by receiv ing their standard 
fu ll rental payment. Switchgrass net income would depend on both the yield and market 
price. At varying yie ld levels, calculating the mi_nimum switchgrass market price at which 
farn1ers could "afford" to make such a production switch illustrates the effects that different 
partial CRP payment leve ls can have as a production incentive. For example, assuming a 
farmer could produce an average of two tons/acre of switchgrass, how great an effect could 
granting a 50% partial CRP payment have on their production decision? What market price 
would the farmer have to receive to make his net income from switchgrass and the CRP 
payment equal to his net income from leaving the land idle? 
Switchgrass Breakeven Prices 
Table 20 illustrates the switcbgrass market prices needed at varying production levels 
for producers to be able to "break-even". The reponed amount is the market price at which 
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producers would receive an equiva len t net income from either leaving their land in full CRP 
or choosing to produce switchgrass given the des ignated partial CRP payment level. The 
greater the payment percentage they continue to receive, the lower the switchgrass price per 
ton they can accept to continue to break even. Comparisons can be made to what could be 
considered a reasonab le switchgrass market price to see how close the two fa ll. 
To find the break.even price, the income the producer is making/retaining must be 
equal to the income the producer is foregoing. Jn other words, the revenue added from 
selling the switchgrass coupled with the CRP land maintenance costs they are foregoi ng must 
be equa l to the CRP revenue they are giving up coupled with the newly acquired switchgrass 
production costs they would incur. To calculate this, a partial budgeting approach is used 
where: 
[(Yield · SWG Price) + (CRP A1aintenance Costs)} - (5) 
[SWG Prod. Costs+ CRP Revenue Foregone} = 0 
Substituting in an assumed yield and an assumed modified CR.P payment level, the 
breakeven market price needed can be ca lculated. The maintenance cost of mowing an acre 
of CRP land is taken as a total of S8.74/acre (Duffy et al 2004). The switchgrass production 
costs can be calculated by using total production cost estimations for grass land production 
found in Table 6. Table 6 represents switchgras production costs wi thout the storage or 
transportation costs. The storage cost of S6. I 9/ton for hoop barn storage and $9.44/ ton for 
transportation arc individually multiplied by tbe producer's assumed yield to account for 
these costs. 
Finally, the CRP revenue foregone can be found by taking the fu ll payment of 
$74.55/acre and determining how much the payment is lowered by subtracting the partial 
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payment. In other words, if a fa rmer could expect to keep 25% of their CRP payment if they 
moved to switchgrass production, they wou ld give up the other 75%. l f the average payment 
is $74.55/acre, the fam1er would give up 75% of that, or $55.9 I/acre. 
For example, assuming a modified CRP payment of 25% and a yield of two tons/acre, 
the switchgrass breakeven price is calculated using the equation found in (5) as follows: 
[2X + 8. 74} - [{(105. 70) + (2 · 6. 19) + (2 · 9.44)} + (0. 75 · 74.55)} = 0 (6) 
Setting the equation equal to zero and solving for the switcbgrass price X determines the 
switchgrass price that producers would need to receive in order to obtain the same net 
income they could expect from leaving their land idle in CRP. ln this case, the breakeven 
price is $92.07/ton. 
The prices in Table 20 are calculated in the same manner: 
Table 20: CRP Switchgrass Breakeven Prices 
Percentage 2 tons/acre 4 tons/acre 6 tons/acre 8 tons/acre 10 tons/acre 
25% $92.07 $61.37 $5 1.13 $46.01 $42.94 
33% $88.96 $59.8 1 $50.10 $45.24 $42.32 
50% $83.49 $57.08 $48.2 1 $43.87 $4 1.23 
75% $73.43 $52.05 $44.92 $4 1.36 $39.22 
100% $72.85 $47.39 $4 1.81 $39.03 $37.35 
The necessary breakeven switchgrass prices vary dramati cally. Given current 
Chariton Valley average production is approx imately two tons/acre, Table 20 shows that the 
market price will need to be quite high regard less of the size of the partial CRP payment they 
are still allowed. Assume that the current average switchgrass market prices fa ll around 
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$45/ton. This price represents a reasonable estimate of the price farmers could expect to get 
for switchgrass if it were being so ld as hay (Hipple 2002). Even receiving their fu ll CRP 
payment and assuming the payment is the only additional "support", the switcbgrass market 
price would still have to be nearly $30 higher-would need to meet at least $72.85- to allow 
switchgrass producers to simply break even. 
At a yield leve l of four tons/acre, the breakeven switchgrass prices shift noticeably 
downward, ranging from $61.37/ton assuming 25% of the current CRP payment to 
$47.39/ton when producers are given a full payment. Four tons/acre is taken to be 
agronomically achievable right now for Chariton Valley producers. At $47.39/ton (when 
given the fu ll CRP payment), the necessary market price is quite c lose to a realistic market 
estimate. At all higher yields, the breakeven prices are lower sti ll. However, it is important 
to be mindful what yields producers could reasonably maintain. 
Assumption Considerations 
For these breakeven prices to be considered operational, it is important to remember a 
few things. First, these prices wi ll be effective assuming that switchgrass producers are 
profit-maximizers . Farmers will make the decision to be switchgrass producers only if they 
can make a higher net income by doing so. Whi le this seems reasonable, there are other 
factors that could weigh into their decision. For example, if producers are utility maximizers, 
net income may be only one of multip le considerations. For further discussion of alternative 
switchgrass adoption motivations, see Hipple et al (2002). A summary of the findings from 
the paper were discussed in Chapter Two. 
In spite of the high potential for many swi tchgrass adoption motivations, this study 
will retain the assumption that fam1ers will primarily choose to adopt switchgrass based on 
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their anticipated profitability. For the pw·poses of thi s analysis the des ignation works well. 
First, dea ling with a utili ty maximizing assumption would severe ly complicate the abil ity to 
draw meaningfu l conclus ions. Each producer would have their own decis ion-mak ing value 
set. Also, while add itional and potentially intangible va lues will p lay a role in a producer's 
deci sion, it is rea listic to assume that net income would certai nl y be a primary consideration 
(Hipple et al 2002). 
CRP as a Successful Incentive Vehicle 
Table 20 shows how higher CRP modified payments have a substantial impact on a 
switchgrass breakeven price. Though retaining a higher payment percentage wou ld be of 
most benefit to producers, the reality of doing so has to be considered. If the government 
aJlows CRP program modification to allow fo r a bioenergy incentive, will their primary 
objective be to reduce the cost of the CRP program or to provide a meaningfu l bioenergy 
incentive? This cho ice will li kely affect the level of modified payment a llowed. 
Based on Table 20, a CRP incentive payment would have to be at least 50% of a ful l 
payment for Chariton Valley farmers to see a meaningful effect. However, if the 
government's objective is to s imply cut the program's cost, could that be expected? For 
example, if the government focus is to cut costs, perhaps they wou ld only consider payments 
less than half of the full payment total, with 50% as their maximum payment scenario. If 
they were seeking to create a significant bioenergy incenti ve, they may be more likely to 
consider payments of at least 50 percent. Though selecting out these payment leve ls is 
purely speculation, it represents the importance of further interpreting the relative likelihood 
of the government actually allowing for various modified payment levels should consider a 
modified payment in the future. 
46 
It is also important to consider the likelihood of the CRP program remaining a 
consistent, politically viable vehicle to provide such an incentive. The CRP is an expensive 
government program. Policymakers are continuing to look for ways to reduce their financial 
commitment to it. Speculation is strong that the CRP program could be phased out 
completely at some point, perhaps even relatively soon. This is a concern when considering 
the abi li ty of CRP to fulfill a dua l ro le as a potential bioenergy incentive. 
The objectives ach ieved through the CRP program are not only fundamentally 
important, they are increasingly relevant. CRP directly affects both land conservation and 
environmental stewardship issues, and indirectly affects the issues of improving water quality, 
reducing soil erosion, etc. If the federal government could modify the program in such a way 
as to reduce their financial burden, whi le simultaneously encouraging the expansion of green 
energy, it could increase the importance and va lue of the program. It could represent an 
incentive to producers to help make bioenergy production possible. The production base 
already exists. All that needs to be done is to make a concerted effort towards developing 
incentive sources such as CRP that could provide a cost supplement to producers at li ttle to 
no expense to the federal government. 
47 
CHAPTER 7. CARBON PAYMENTS 
The accelerating increases in greenhouse gas emissions and growing concern over 
global wa.mllng have caused the United States and the rest of the world to take a more 
earnest look at ways to mitigate the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. A 
dilemma ex ists over how best to mitigate carbon release because carbon dioxide is the 
primary by-product of all fossil fuel-based energy production. Implementing emission 
regulations geared towards reducing carbon levels could have a potentially serious effect on 
energy prices, and thereby overall economic growth. 
The U.S. exercises strict regulations over the release of harmful pollutant gases like 
sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, etc. In contrast, U.S. carbon dioxide emission reductions 
remain strictl y voluntary. Even so, there are companies who are choosing to address their 
C02 emissions either for public image purposes or as a preemptive measure, thinking there 
may be a time in the future when C02 reductions may become required. To facilitate these 
companies' efforts, the estab lishment of independent carbon markets is coming to the 
forefront. 
Carbon Markets 
Carbon markets are a natural extension of existing pollution emissions markets that 
have been established in the United States. Regional markets host emission trading for 
pollutants like sulfur dioxides (by far the largest and most commercially successful emissions 
trading market), nitrous oxides and vo latile organic compounds. (Antares 2004, Ard 2004). 
While the technical infrastructure of each of these trading markets may differ, the overall 
idea is the same. Most commonly, a government or private overseeing body wi ll establish an 
emissions cap or baseline for all participating polluters. The cap is a limit to how much 
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pollution each polluter is a llowed to release. The level is traditionally related in some way to 
the emiss ion level they currentl y re lease- either some percentage reduction of their ex isting 
tota l, a specificall y assigned maximum emissions limit that is still a reflection of their 
production levels, or a reduction to an emissions total from a prior year p icked to be their 
baseline. 
Once the cap levels are established, polluters must meet this emiss ions limit or face 
regu latory pena lty. They can meet their emission limit either by cutting their own emission 
production, or by purchasing pollution units ("credits") from the emissions market. These 
credits are put up for sale by other participating po lluters who have succeeded at reducing 
their own emiss ions below their set target. Using a market allows for equa lization of the 
margina l abatement costs of each participating polluter, creating an economically effic ient 
outcome. 
A carbon market differs s ignificantly from other emissions trading markets in a 
notable way. The reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S. is a strictly voluntary 
undertaking. As such, participation in carbon markets is vo luntary as well. A lso unique to 
C02 abatement is th at in addition to direct emission abatement, atmospheric C02 reduction 
can be ach ieved through carbon sequestration. Carbon sequestration is the method of 
captu ring, removing and storing carbon dioxide al ready created and present in the 
atmosphere (DOE Office of Foss il Energy 2004). Sequestering can be achieved through the 
establishment of vegetative cover, wh ich takes in C02. S ince carbon sequestration can 
indirectly create the intended atmospheric reductions, the strategy can generate tradable C02 
reduction units tradable in some carbon markets. 
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Chicago Climate Exchange 
The most noted carbon market in the U.S. is the Chicago Climate Exchange. The 
Exchange is a cap-and-trade carbon market forma lly opened in October of 2003 and made up 
of voluntary member participants. All panicipants have agreed to a lega lly binding 
commitment of reducing their carbon emiss ions by 4% below the average of their 1998-200 l 
emissions by the year 2006. The market is based on trades of carbon unit credits achieved 
both through direct C02 emiss ion reduction by the market participant, as well as through 
carbon sequestration techniques. Each tradable credi t represents one hundred tons of C02. 
Currently the Exchange has over 70 members, including Ford Motor Company, Dupont, 
Dow Coming, Ro lls-Royce and Motorola, a long with many others. The University of Iowa 
and the Iowa Fann Bureau are a lso participating members (Chicago Climate Exchange 2004). 
Switchgrass, carbon sequestration, and carbon markets 
Using a carbon market similar to the Chicago Climate Exchange could give 
switchgrass producers a second financial incentive oppo1tunity. Switchgrass offers a 
tremendous potential fo r vegetative carbon sequestration. It takes in carbon dioxide from tbe 
atmosphere to use as a fu el source through photosynthesis and stores large amounts of carbon 
in its root systems and plant body. 
Different vegetation sequesters carbon at differing quantities. Trees are the largest 
carbon sinks, both because of their large physica l s ize and their long stand life. Agricultural 
crops like com and soybeans have the capacity to store carbon as well, but on a much smaller 
scale. Their root systems are much shallower. In addition it is a crop 's long-term storage 
effectiveness that matters when it comes to carbon market eligibi lity. Com and soybeans 
sequestration levels depend on a farmer's land management of the soil. As a perennial grass, 
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switchgrass' average carbon storage capacity falls somewhere between trees and row crops. 
Its actual capaci ty can vary depending on many factors including stand age, soil landscape, 
previous soi l uses, overall soil management, depth of soi l measurement for presence of 
carbon, and even weather (Bun-as 2002). 
The most likely outlet through which Chariton Valley producers could sell 
sequestered carbon units would be the Chicago Climate Exchange. To do so they would 
need an accurate assessment of how much carbon their fields sequester. In the Chariton 
Valley, research into switchgrass' carbon sequestration potential is bei ng conducted. 
Detennining a precise level of sequestration whi le accounting for all the inherent variability 
is a difficult task. The Climate Exchange uses the average number of tons sequestered as a 
way to account fo r the va riability and fac ilitate smoother trading. The average soil organic 
carbon in the Chariton Valley switchgrass fields would represent a baseline estimation on the 
level of sequestered carbon for trading on the Exchange. 
Chariton Valley Carbon Sequestration 
Based on research data, 3- to 14-year-old switchgrass stands have sequestered an 
average of 50 to 55 tons/acre of carbon. Soil organic carbon (SOC) increases at an annual 
rate of 0. 75 tons/acre/year to a I 0-inch depth, or 1.50 tons/acre/year to a 40-inch depth 
(Burras 2002). Trading at the Exchange is done using Carbon Financial Instruments (CFis), 
which are bundles of l 00 metric tons of C02• 
The trading value of the CFis on the Exchange board tends to fluctuate between $0. 70 
and $ 1.00 per CFI (Chicago Climate Exchange 2004). Therefore, if producers were being 
paid based on the total amount of SOC in the soil, a sequestration level of approximately 50 
tons/acre could expect to receive between $0.40 and $0.50. If, however, producers were paid 
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based off of their average annual increase in SOC (a much more likely scenario), the reported 
increase of between 0.75 tons/year and J .5 tons/year would yield an essentially negligible 
payment. 
For the purposes of acting as a viable production incentive, current carbon prices are 
very low. If switchgrass producers were to sell their sequestered ca rbon in a market like tbe 
Exchange they would get very little revenue. However, it is still valuable to see the effect a 
carbon payment could have if the payment prices were higher. Table 21 shows the effects of 
a carbon payment on various " breakeven" switchgrass price needed. The carbon payment 
breakeven prices are found in the same way as the modified CRP payment breakeven price 
scenarios in Table 20 in the prev ious chapter. In th is case, the prices in the table are what the 
switchgrass price would need to be for producers to receive equal revenue from either 
leaving their CRP land enrolled and taking their guaranteed payment, or raising switchgrass 
and se lling it as a biofuel whi le giving up their CRP revenue completely. 
The left co lumn of the table lists hypothetica l carbon payment p ri ces. Actual pri ces 
are far removed from these levels, but these payment scenarios show what the ca rbon 
payment level would need to be at to achieve a significant effect as an incentive. A $12/ton 
payment scenario was specificall y included for consideration. A $ 12/ton payment is at the 
high end of a payment range currently being repo1ted by EU analysts observing early 
contract trading in tbeir regional carbon market (more extensive discussion of this market is 
fou nd at the end of this chapter). Assuming that a simi Jar payment was availab le to Chariton 
Valley producers, the same payment level was incorporated here. 
All breakeven prices were aga in ca lculated using a partia l budgeting approach. The 
table specifies the yie ld level and carbon payment level used for each price. The average 
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CRP payment and the switchgrass production costs that were used in the previous chapter for 
Table 20 were again used in this calculation. lf trading were to take place, the amount of 
el igib le carbon to be so ld will like ly be ba ed on the average ann ual increase in sequestered 
carbon in the switchgrass soil. For th is reason the so il organic carbon (SOC) level was taken 
to be 1.5 tons/acre, the average annual increase per acre to a 40-inch depth as repotted by 
Burras 2002. If sequestration was recognized only to a I 0-inch depth by the Exchange, the 
SOC level used would be 0.75 tons/acre. A description of this calculation is found in (7), and 
an example using the $5/ton ca rbon payment level at 2 tons/acre yield is fo und in (8). 
[(Yield· SWG Price) + (CRP Maintenance Costs) + 
(SOC · Carbon Payment Price)] - (7) 
[SWG Prod. Costs + CRP Revenue Foregone} = 0 
[2X + 8. 74 + 1.5(5.00)] - [((105. 70) + (2 · 6. 19) + (2 · 9.44)) + ( 74.55)] = 0 (8) 
Solving for the switchgrass price X in (8) yie lds a needed price of $97.64/ ton. A ll 
prices in Table 2 1 are calculated in a si milar fashion. 
Table 21. Carbon Payment w itchgrass Breakeven Prices 
C02 Pymt. 2 tons/acre 4 tons/acre 6 tons/acre 8 tons/acre I 0 tons/acre 
$5/ton $97.64 $64. 15 $52.99 $47.4 1 $44.06 
$ 10/ton $93.88 $62.28 $5 1. 74 $46.49 $43.3 1 
$ 12/ton $92.39 $6 1.53 $5 1.24 $46.09 $43.0 1 
$25/ton $82.64 $56.65 $47.99 $43.66 $4 1.06 
$50/ton $63.89 $47.2 $4 1.74 $38.97 $37.3 1 
$ I 00/ ton $26.38 $28.53 $29.23 $29.59 $29.8 1 
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The first two yield columns are close to cu1Tent C hariton Valley yields . At those 
yields, it would take a very high carbon payment to bring the switcbgrass breakeven price 
down to a reasonable range. For example, at 2 tons/acre yie ld, even a $50/ton carbon 
payment still leaves a needed switch grass market price of $63.89/ton to give fa rmers back an 
income equivalent to what they were getting from CRP enrollment. The outlook improves 
slightly as yield increases to 4 tons/acre, but until carbon payments would reach $ 100/ ton, the 
switchgrass price would still remain very high. 
Table 2 1 gives a good look at what impact carbon paym ents cou ld have as an 
incentive to p roducers if they were at higher levels. The hypothetical payments are much 
higher than those being rea lized now. As was mentioned earlier, fo r example, one carbon 
financial instrument (CFI) on the Exchange, representi ng l 00 tons of carbon, was sell ing at a 
high of $ 1.00/C FI. The lowest payment level included in the table was $5.00/individual ton 
of carbon. This is a significant difference. Even though the hypothetical payment levels are 
not ones that can be realized right now, they still provide valuable insight into what level a 
carbon payment would eventuall y have to reach if it was to become a viable switchgrass 
production incentive. 
Federal subs idies fo r green energy alternatives, other than ethano l, are not a lways 
ava ilable. When the subsidies are available, they may not m ake a signifi cant impact. Federal 
and state governments themselves have begun earnestly supporting market-based solutions to 
pollution control issues in recent years . Emissions markets like carbon markets- though 
they may be vo luntary-will continue to evolve over time. As a result, the idea of utili zing a 
developed carbon market should factor into any approach to encouraging switchgrass 
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production in Chari ton Valley specificall y, or even bioenergy crop production in general. 
Further discussion of this idea wi ll be presented in Chapter 9. 
International Carbon Trading Markets 
Other countries have taken the initiative and deve loped their own carbon markets as 
we ll. The strong influence of the Kyoto Protocols abroad has fu1ther influenced the push 
towards development of these markets. Many of the countries creating the pi lot markets are 
much more committed to the idea of serious carbon abatement, and in some cases have 
created mandatory industry participation. Developed industrial countries like Denmark 
(mandatory participation for specific industries) and the U.K. (subsid ized, open and 
voluntary participation) consistentl y experience higher demand for abated and sequestered 
carbon, spurred on by new greenhouse gas emission regulations being piloted on domestic 
levels, determined by and adapted to each individual nation. 
The European Union as a whole is also preparing to launch its own extensive trading 
market for all EU countri es . It is slated to be full y operational by January 2005. Some 
companies who will be participating in this market have actually begun trading early by 
contractual agreement (actua l allowances cannot change hands until the market 's official 
open in January, though payment for allowances can take place early). They have even 
begun reporting on initial trade prices. Reports on these early contracts place the average 
payment at between 6.5 and 9.5 euros per ton (between $8. 11 and $ 11.85 U.S. dollars), with 
an average trade size at 5,000 tons. Analysts predict trade sizes to increase to around 50,000 
tons once formal trading is opened in January (Environmental Science and Technology 2004). 
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International Opportunities for U.S. Carbon 
Unfortunately, these still-fledgling international markets would not present U.S. switchgrass 
growers with any additional carbon trading outlets. The trades are limited to participants in 
each country or region- no international trading- as well as further limited in some 
instances to designated industries . In addition, not all markets will accept carbon 
sequestration credits as a llowable carbon abatement. Each market is designed differently and 
has different trading guide li nes. 
Developing international trading capabilities wou ld be an ultimate goal (and a 
primary goa l of the Kyoto Protocol), but currentl y there are m any questions as to the way in 
which international carbon trades could be most efficiently made. One of the primary points 
of debate is how to establish a carbon tradable permit that would be uniform and consistent 
across all participating countries (Ellerman et al 2003). Reliable, accurate internationa l data 
from all participating countries would be critical. This would require prec ise data tracking 
and accounting systems, as well as the establishment of a verification and enforcement 
system. Beyond this, se lect countri es undertaking their own carbon trading scenarios on a 
domestic level presentl y establi sh their own methods of participation, of measuring carbon 
abatement, carryi ng out market transactions, etc. With issues such as these remaining to be 
addressed, there i.s too mucb diss imilarity between the various countries' programs to be able 
to effectively trade carbon cred its beyond domestic borders at this time. 
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CHAPTER 8. GREEN TAG PAYIVlENTS 
Green Tag Payment Description 
The ten11 "green payment" can be used to describe the dollar va lue as ociated with 
the added positive environmental attributes generated by using renewab le energy sources like 
so lar wind, or biofuel power. A green tag paymen t is a more specific instance of a green 
payment. ft represents the cost premium attached to the abi lity to purchase the relatively 
more expensive green power from a power provider. By definition a green tag payment 
essentia ll y represents an incenti ve concept where indi vidua ls who consume the most energy, 
pay the most. 
Typically, a power plant wil l ei ther generate or purchase green power to offset part of 
their production of nom1al "dirty" energy. In app lication, a green tag payment is usually 
voluntaril y made either by the local consumers buying the power from the power plant, or by 
outside individuals who still want to encourage/subsidize the genera tion and use of green 
power. Outside individuals buying green power generall y do so through the purchase of 
green tags through an independent green energy broker. Because this project will focus on 
the consumers who are actually using the green power, the green energy broker payment 
option will not be explored. 
The concept of havi ng consumers pay a premium for the ab ility to purchase green 
energy directly from their own power plant (what wi ll hereafter be referred to as a green 
payment to tbe power plant) is a valuable policy option. pecifically app lied to the Chariton 
Va lley project, green power wou ld allow local consumers purchasing power from the 
Ottumwa Generating Station to vol untari ly pay a premium for the ability to purchase green 
power generated by the power plant's u e of switchgrass. It would be bil led to the 
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participating consumers as an add itiona l charge per kWh used, and would be paid to the 
power plant. The green tag incentive differs from n pa11ia l CRP or a carbon payment, both of 
which are direct incentive payment to switchgrass producers. Green tag payments, in 
contrast, would be an indirect benefit to producers by increasing the price the power plant 
could be w illing to pay for switchgrass. 
A lliant bas an existing voluntary green payment program called Second Nature® that 
allow con umers to subs idize green energy. The program has three different participation 
levels where consumers can choose their desired level of fi nancia l commitment or green 
power generation. A lliant has estab lished a premium level of 2.0 cents/kWh to cover the 
renewable po11ion of the energy generated. That is, ifn consumer wants to pay a full 
premium- allowing them to have their energy purchase be 100% renewable energy- they 
would pay an additional 2.0 cents/kWh fo r every kWh they consume. The three participation 
levels a llow consumers to cboose from three co rresponding payment levels va rying 
according to the fraction of renewable power being purchased . Under their Nature Sentinel® 
product, consumers pay an additional 0.5 cents/kWh fo r 25% renewable power their Eco 
Watcher® product yields 50% renewable power for an additional 1.0 cents/kWh, and for 
consumers who want l 00% renewable power the Earth Steward® product requires a fu ll 
premium payment of an addi ti ona l 2.0 cents/kWh (Chariton Valley Peer Review 2003). 
This payment can be translated to estimate the effect it wou ld have on swi tchgrass 
producers. One dry ton of switchgrass contains approxi mately 14.5 m illion Btu's of energy 
(Walsh 1996). This converts to approximate ly 4,260 kWh of power. The degree to which a 
green tag payment can subs idize this power depends on the program participation level the 
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consumer chooses, and how much the effects of the subsidy could be passed on to the 
producers. 
For a consumer in the Nature Sentinel program paying 0.5 cents/kWh, thi s would 
work out to a $2 1.30/ton subsidy (0.5 cents multiplied by the 4,260 kWh/dry ton of 
switchgrass). Consumers in the Eco Watcher group paying l .0 cents/kWh would be 
providing a $42.60/ton subsidy. Those in the Earth Steward program contributing an 
additional 2.0 cents/kWh would provide a support payment twice that s ize, or $85.20/ton. 
The values are also shown in Table 23. 
Table 22: Maximum Subsidy Resulting From a Green Tag Payment 
Participation Level: 
Maxi mum subsidy: 
Nature Sentinel 
(2 5% green) 







These payments are substantial. It is important, however, to remember that these 
payments are going to the power plant and not the switchgrass producer. The green tag 
payment is an indirect subsidy. It is an incentive for the power plant to purchase green power 
in general and not switchgrass specifically. The degree to which switcbgrass producers 
would benefit would depend on how many consumers were participating in the voluntary 
program. It would also depend on how much of the power plant's total green power was 
coming from switchgrass relative to other green sources. In addition, not all the incentive 
income from the green tag would go directly to the feedstock producers. The power plant 
could put part of it to other uses- for example, they could put it towards acquiring the 
needed capital (new equipment, etc.) to burn switchgrass. The relative influence of these 
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additional factors would need to be determined before it could be known how large an impact 
a green tag payment wou ld have on switchgrass producers themselves. 
In spite of these uncertain influences, the significant impact of a green tag payment 
can still be shown. Assuming that a producer could be paid a green payment on a per-ton 
basis (see Table 22) for a ll the switchgrass they would produce, the potential of the payment 
can begin to be seen. 
For example, suppose a scenario where the power plant pays switcbgrass producers 
$16/ton fo r their switchgrass ($ 16/ton being the average price of coal given in Chapter 5). 
Assuming production on grassland, subtracting$ J 6/ ton from the total delivered grass land 
production costs per ton in Table l 9 leaves the remaining cost difference left to be addressed. 
For example, at a two ton/acre yield, switch grass production costs are $ I 00.40/ton, so after 
being paid $ 16 by the power plant for a ton of switcbgrass, the producer would be left with 
$84.40 in production costs not covered. 
If the producer received some part of the green tag payment consumers pay to the 
power plant, could the payment make up part of the uncovered production cost? According 
to Table 22, if producers were to receive the fu ll green tag payment at the 100% green power 
level (where consumers are paying a 2.0 cent/kWh premium) from the power plant, it would 
almost perfectly cover their remaining costs. A 2.0 cent/kWh premium, translated to 
$85.20/ton, would be just s lightly more than the $84.40/ton the switchgrass producer wou ld 
need. 
Table 23 expands the above comparison at all yield levels and at each green tag 
premium level. Using grassland per-ton production costs from Table J 9 and the per-ton 
green tag payment values fou nd in Table 22, the table shows what percentage of each green 
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tag premium paid to the power plant that the power plant would than have to transfer to 
switchgrass producers for producers to cover their remaining production costs. The table 
assumes that producers are already being paid $16/ton, the average coal price estimate, by the 
power plant for their switchgrass. Some of the tab le entries are blank, indicating that even if 
producers were to receive the fu ll amount of the specified green tag payment, it wou ld still 
not equal their remaining production costs. 
Table 23. P ercent of Green Tag Payment Necessary to E quate Switchgrass Cost of 
P d . L C I E . I P . c· G P P . L I ro u ction ess a oa :qmva ent nee 1ven a re en ayment remmm eve 
Green payment 2 tons/acre 4 tons/acre 6 tons/acre 8 tons/acre l 0 tons/acre 
level 
0.05 cents/kWh --- --- --- --- ---
(25% green) 
1.0 cents/kWh --- --- 89% 75% 67% 
(50% f.{reen) 
2.0 cents/kWh 99% 58% 45% 38% 34% 
( 100% green) 
For example, if a producer's switchgrass yields are at 4 tons/acre, receiving a full 
green tag payment of $2 1.30/ ton (representing the per-ton value of the 25% green power 
premium level of 0.05 cents/kWh) from the power plant wi ll not cover the production costs 
remaining after receiving a $16/ton payment for the switchgrass itself. The ful l payment of 
$42.60/ton from the 50% green power premium level also falls short. But if the producer 
were to be g iven 58% of the green tag payment from the I 00% green power premium level 
of $85.20/ton, that payment would make up the remaining production cost difference. 
Table 23 shows that a green tag payment has the potential to be a signi ficant incentive 
payment for switchgrass producers. A fu ll payment at the 25% green energy level does not 
completely offset remaining production costs at any yield level, but the 50% green power 
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level is ab le to do so starting at 6 tons/acre yields. The l 00% green power level payment 
could be effective at every yield level. 
In addition, Table 23 not only shows the potential effectiveness of a green tag 
payment as a stand-alone switchgrass incentive, but also its effectiveness at being a 
significant part of an overall incentive package. Even if producers were not able to receive 
enough of a green tag payment from the power plant to make up the whole production cost 
difference, it could sti ll make up a large part. lfthe green tag payment was not a producer's 
only incentive, partia l payments at the 25% and 50% green power levels would become even 
more significant. 
A green tag payment could serve as a significant incentive source to switchgrass 
producers. Table 23 represents one scenario that shows this. In order to make precise 
conclusions, a much more complex analysis would need to be done to account for the 
variability of green tag income to the power plant and the proporiion of green energy 
generation that switchgrass represents to the power plant (s ince the green tag payment is 
made to the power plant for green energy generation, not just green energy generated by 
swi tchgrass). In add ition, the analysis wou ld also need to take into account that the power 
p lant would not necessarily be able to pass along the fu ll green tag payment to producers. 
They may need to utilize a po11ion of it for capital expenditures related to burning 
switchgrass in their plant. 
Accounting for these additional considerations may adjust the relative effectiveness 
of the green payment as a producer i11centive. Even so, the substantia l impact the payment 
could have in a basic scenario like the one represented in Table 23 suggests that even after 
the adjustments, the green payment could prove to be very valuable to switchgrass producers. 
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Potential of a Green Tag Payment 
The green tag payment, as a consumption-based payment, creates a more 
economically efficient incentive. This payment is also complementary to the modified CRP 
and carbon market payment options by being a way for consumers to play a role in a green 
energy incentive. A green tag can better effect the back-side of the energy production 
process-i.e. , the consumption side- and indirectly create a bioenergy producer incentive by 
allowing the power plant to recover some of the added cost of using a green energy by 
passing part of it along to energy consumers. Table 23 also showed how a green tag payment 
could even be directly passed on if the power plant transfers some part of the payment to 
switchgrass producers. Acting either as a direct or indirect producer incentive, a green tag 
payment represents an incentive that shows a great deal of promise. 
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CHAPTER 9. lMPLICATIONS AND VARIATIONS BETWEEN INCENTIVE USES 
The three previous chapters presented three different switchgrass incentive options 
that could be used to equate the costs at which switchgrass producers can deliver switchgrass 
to the power plant and the price the power plant is willing to pay. The three incentive 
options differ on a fundamental level. The CRP payment represents a standard type of 
government support program, the carbon payment represents the use of a market-based 
payment incentive, and the green tag payment represents an indirect consumer-based 
payment. The three payment types bave advantages and disadvantages outside of the actual 
nominal value of the payment itself. 
Modified CRP Payment: Advantages and Disadvantages 
The modified CRP government payment could provide a s ignificant subsidy for 
switchgrass production. The varying modified CRP payment level could produce a 
significant impact on the needed breakeven market price. Table 20 showed that even at only 
a fifty percent modified payment, the impact on the breakeven price is sti ll evident. Also, a 
modification to the already-ex isting CRP program would be an easily perceived transition by 
farmers within a fam il iar program. The security of knowing that their incentive support was 
coming from a known government program could help allay worry regarding any perceived 
risks of transitioning to a potentially variable income source. 
In an economic sense, the modified CRP payment would represent a way of 
internaliz ing the environmental benefits to society brought about by switchgrass production 
with its associated soil and water benefits. Farmers with land in CRP are paid to keep their 
land idle and protect it with vegetative cover, an action that subsequently protects against soil 
erosion and serious chemical mnoff that could be generated from using tbe land for continual 
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row crop production. Planting switchgrass fo r use as a bioenergy crop would retai n the 
environmental benefits of the C RP land, whi le the modified CRP payment paid to producers 
would represent a uni fom1, s implified way to attach a va lue those benefits. A more exact 
va luation wo uld be impractica l, as it would invo lve complex mode ling and require constant 
and precise meas urements of a wide variety of continuall y changing agronomic variables 
fro m each swi tchgrass acre. The partial C RP payment could thus be a practical way for the 
government to subsidize the desired environmental qual it ies. 
A perceived disadva ntage, at least from the government's perspective, is that the 
paymen t is still essentia lly a government subsidy payment. It would still come wi th the 
attached social costs of utilizing a subsidy as an economic too l by creating market distortion 
and inefficient supply levels. As such, the government will need to answer for themselves 
whether or not they want to take on a substantive part o f e ither the fi scal or socia l 
responsibi lity of making switchgrass into a commercia ll y profitab le bioenergy crop. From an 
economic and politi cal vantage point, they certain ly have a vested interest in wanti ng to 
encourage green energy commercial development. Economica ll y, government continues to 
seek diversified energy sources and reduce dependence on foreign energy inputs. Sociall y, 
there is increased emphasis improving the condition of the natural environment for both 
aesthetic va lue a well as the practi ca l issue o f sustainabi li ty. Fina ll y, fro m a practical 
standpoint, the government themselves would benefit. The overall ex isting cost of the CRP 
program would go down, and with little to no net environmental quality tradeoffs. 
Government payments are in place for other agricultu ra l commodities, and certainly 
even other existing energy sources- fossil fuels themselves being a maj or one- and they 
serve a similar pu rpose. In the case of agri cultura l commodities, the existence of subs id ies 
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signifies that the government fee ls the social benefits of a strong agricu ltural program and 
supporting U.S. farmers justify the financial cost. In the case of fossil fuels, subsidies 
represent the government's decision that the social benefits of having a more inexpensive 
energy source available justify the financ ial cost. Following thi s reasoning, it falls to 
policymakers to determine if bioenergy crop development is a priority to the diversification 
of energy sources, to society and to the environment in general, and whether it warrants 
financial support from a government program. 
Carbon Payments: Advantages and Disadvantages 
The current direct financial impact of a carbon payment on switchgrass production is 
minimal. The potential of receiving less than $ 1 per acre is not of significant financial value 
to producers. The continued voluntary nature of U.S. carbon trading wi ll persist in keeping 
payment levels for pem1its low. However, the idea of representing the potential of the 
market to create an independent and efficient incentive is a valuable one. 
The U.S. sulfur market illustrates how successfu l an emissions market can be when it 
is well-designed, managed soundly, and is closely monitored and regulated. The market has 
made a substantial impact on both sulfur dioxide abatement and the associated abatement 
costs. Within ten years of the establi shment of trading, sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-
fired power plants were reduced by more than 50%, at costs of less than one-third of even the 
most generous initial estimates (Ellemian et al. 2000, 2003). 
Carbon trading presents different, more significant economic challenges were it to 
move to some fo rm of mandatory trading status, but the effective impact of such a move 
should not be di scounted, even when started on a smaller, more regional scale. If a pilot 
program or regional carbon market were launched with mandatory participation for power 
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plants or other industry players and carbon sequestration was planned for as an acceptable 
method of abatement, it is important fo r switchgrass producers to know the value it could 
ho ld for them. Table 2 1 of C hapter 7 shows the impact a more substantial carbon payment 
would have on needed switchgrass market prices. At these higher carbon prices, the effects 
of a carbon payment can match and in some cases surpass the effects of a modified CRP 
payment. 
Regional Push for Carbon Mitigation 
If a carbon payment were clearing at a market leve l that was financia ll y s ignificant to 
bioenergy producers, it could al low Lhc government to modify the level of its support in 
response. Table 21 shows the theoreti cal potential for uccess is there. In order for it to be a 
realistic consideration, however, the purpose and the design of the carbon markets as they 
stand today would have to change. In the U.S., although ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is 
no longer being considered, there have been some state- level government movements that are 
looking towards C02 mitigation. New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, Oregon and New 
Jersey have set up greenhouse gas registries. In August o f 2003, nine Northeastern governors 
committed to work towards developing a regional cap-and-trade program for greenhouse 
gases. If these development overtures were to continue, carbon payments could become a 
more signi ficant incentive source in ti me (DOE ElA, Climate Change Policy Developments 
2004). 
Green Payments: Advantages and Disadvantages 
The fi nal consideration, the consumer-based green tag payment, represents a third 
incentive poss ibi lity. W hile the ca rbon market incentives are supplied through "upstream" 
energy users- production and other industrial sources- the green tag payment would be 
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attached to the "downstream" users, i.e. all energy consumers themselves. The green tag 
payment would a lso be usage-proportional, since the payment would be a per-kWh set 
nominal fee (essentially a per-unit green energy "tax"). Consumers using more energy would 
pay more. 
The e ffects of a green payment would be indirectl y felt by switcbgrass producers, in 
contrast to the first two direct incentive options. The nature of a green tag payment indicates 
that it wi ll be paid to the power plants and not the fam1ers (a lthough Chapter 8 discusses a 
scenario where the power plant could transfer a part of that payment to producers). The 
effects of adding thi s type of consumer incentive into an overal l incentive "package" could 
be varied. 
A green payment has the potentia l to involve a group of energy users-everyday 
individual energy consumers- that were not necessari ly being directly reached with the first 
two incentive options. On the other hand, there is the chance that indi rect effects from either 
of the first two incentives could be felt by thi s group. This cou ld be as a resu lt of natural 
income re-distribution resulting from a government subsidy. lndirect effects could also be 
fe lt through higher consumer good prices (energy or otherwise) from industri es involved in 
abatement investments to reduce their carbon emissions as they partic ipate in carbon market 
trad ing. Such scenarios cou ld force consumers to bear a portion of the bioenergy incentive 
that is larger than intended. [n a s ituation where a green tag payment became a prominent 
incentive tool, these potentia l possibilities would need to be evaluated and addressed to 
detennine exactly how a more comprehensive green tag program should be designed. 
Another important consideration is that in the current case of green tag payments, the 
decision as to whether or not to participate is still voluntary. Though this could reduce the 
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relative weight of some of the concerns mentioned above, it would a lso mean that the income 
the power plant receives from green tag payments could be inconsistent and potentially 
unsubstantial. Consumers may think the idea of subsidizing green energy is a great one and 
be in full ideologica l support. When it comes time for them to make the decision to 
participate and actually pay the premiums, however, they may decide even though they are in 
support of the idea, they don 't want to spend the additional money. They could choose to 
leave it to other consumers to foot the bill. Or they may e lect to participate for a short time, 
and then decide they no longer want to pay the premiums. 
Table 22 in Chapter 8 showed a starting baseline as to what the different green tag 
program levels would be ab le to contribute, showing that the payment holds significant 
potential in being a very successful incentive. Table 23 enforced that potentia l by showing 
its effecti veness in a scenari o when the power plant is ab le to transfer the payment to 
switchgrass producers. Overal l, the green tag payment' s success as an incentive would 
depend on the number of consumers participating in the voluntary program at any given time 
and the level of financial support they generated for the plant (i.e., which premium program 
leve l they subscribed to). It would a lso depend on what portion of their premium payments 
would be dedicated to switcbgrass use at the plant itself. Power plants can create green 
energy portfolios that are diversified between several different c lean energy sources. How 
much of the consumer consumer-paid green payment incentive would be available to 
switcbgrass producers would depend on how much tbe power plant would use switchgrass as 
a green energy source relative to its other green energy options. 
Conclusions 
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Each of the three incentive options bas different advantages and disadvantages. The 
modified CRP payment ho lds good potential. rts effecti veness will depend on producer 
yields, the level of the modified CRP payment allowed, and on the market price of 
switchgrass itself. It will also depend on the federal government's willingness to adapt an 
existing government program and allow it to work as a bioenergy subsidy. 
Due to its voluntary nature, the carbon payment is at a developmental stage and 
would not offer significant help at this time. However, the fundamental idea of using such a 
market-based payment in conjunction with other incentives is important. If more expansive 
carbon market participation developed and carbon prices increased, it could serve as a much 
more significant subsidy. 
The green tag payment seems to be the incentive with the most promise. It also 
provides a viable subsidy option that does not depend on a government payment but one that 
comes from energy consumers themselves. The effects of outside variables on the incentive 
level it could offer switchgrass producers would still need to be determined to know exactly 
how much assistance it could provide, but even so, the green tag payment seems to be an 
option that deserves serious consideration. 
All three incentive sources wi ll continue to evolve as continued emphasis is placed on 
green energy development. As they develop, each incentive will be able to make a more 
significant individual financia l impact on swi tchgrass producers. When looked at 
collectively, they have the potential to play a significant role in a very balanced incentive 
program to create a successful and profitable switchgrass feedstock supply. 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSIONS 
Utilizing switchgrass as a bioenergy feedstock has been shown to be one of the most 
promising and viable sources of biofuel production. The agro nomic and environmental 
attributes are favorable to consistent large-scale production, and the energy potential as a fuel 
is desirable. In order to be a potential fuel feedstock, however, switchgrass' production costs 
must be low enough to be competitive with other forms of energy. 
Production costs reported in Chapter 4 show that switchgrass costs of production vary 
depending on a few key variables. Yield is the major determining factor that influences costs. 
To be commercially competitive, switchgrass producers wi ll need to consistently produce at 
higher yield levels. Chariton Valley producers currently yield on average two to three 
tons/acre. They would benefit from adopting methods of increasing yields through 
production management. Agronomic research must continue to improve management 
techniques and plant genetics. 
In addition, land charges play a very significant ro le. Strictly from a cost perspective, 
any changes in producer land charges create a signi fica nt change in tota l production costs. 
However, as the potential productiv ity of farmland increases, its land charge also increases. 
Switchgrass producers must balance yield potential with associated land charge in deciding 
what land to devote to switchgrass production. 
Switchgrass ' total deliverable costs in general were shown to be too high fo r 
producers to be profitable as well as competitive with coal. As a result, various incentive 
payments were discussed. The three chosen here represented payments from three different 
payment types. A government incentive in the fo rm of a modified CRP payment, a market-
based incentive in the form of a carbon market payment, and a consumer-based incentive in 
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the form of a green-tag payment were all examined. All three have relative policy and 
societal advantages and disadvantages, as discussed in Chapter 9, but they represent diverse 
opt ions in addressing the existing gap between the deliverable cost of switchgrass vs. what 
the power plant will/is able to pay. 
A modified CRP payment represented a government incentive that could create a 
significant financial benefit to switchgrass producers. A CRP payment option could also be 
seen as a more secure incentive option by switchgrass producers already familiar with the 
ex isting government program. ln addi tion, modify ing the program would potentially allow 
for a net reduction of overall CRP payments made by the government (cutting the program's 
cost) while serving as a valuable bioenergy incentive. 
The carbon payment was shown to have little impact as an incentive to switchgrass 
producers, given current carbon prices. The value of the paym ent was shown to be more 
substantial if carbon prices were to rise in the future. If prices increase, the market-based 
carbon payment would be an excellent incentive source, as it would represent an excellent 
way fo r switchgrass producers to benefit from essentially a non-governmental bioenergy 
subsidy. 
The green tag payment was shown to have great potentia l to producers. It appeared to 
be the incentive that could have the largest impact on covering the cost difference between 
switchgrass production and coa l. The payment's re lative effecti veness at do ing so would 
greatl y depend on other variables, such as energy consumer parti cipation and how much of 
the payment could be transferred, directl y or indirectly, back to switchgrass producers. But 
the fact that it represents a potentially significant incentive source that would be usage-based 
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and independent of a government subsidy indicates that it should be an important 
consideration in any switcbgrass incentive plan. 
Having a plentiful and affordable energy supply is of incredible importance to society. 
The regulation and subsidization of the fossi l fuel industry testifies to this importance. In 
recent years, as concern for the environmental implications of heavy fossil fuel usage bas 
grown, the impo1tance of the development of greener energy sources has also increased. As 
government and society begins to look to bioenergy and other green energy sources with 
increasing regularity, mainta ining that same standard of commercial availability and 
affordabi lity is a primary objective. To that end, transferring the same type of economic 
support received by fossi I fuels to switchgrass and other green energy sources is key. In the 
case of switchgrass, it wou ld establish a more level playing fie ld in tenns of energy 
production and it would help to equate the existing cost differences between the achievable 
total deliverable costs of switchgrass and the cheap cost of coal. This would ultimately 
create a very promising opportunity for switchgrass to become a commercially competitive 
green energy source. 
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APPENDIX A. COST BREAKDO\VN FOR S\VITCHGRA S PRODUCTIO ON 
CROPLAND 
Table 24: Establishment Costs for witchgra s Production on Cropland 
PREHARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variable Labor Total 
OPERATIONS Costs($) Costs ($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
(Hrs) Cost/Acre 
($) 
Disc (Tandem) 3.07 1.35 0.07 5. 15 
llan-ow 1.68 0.57 0.05 2.7 1 
Airflow Spreader (seed & fertilizers) 1.94 0.9 1 0. 12 4.03 
Spraying chemical 1.1 6 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOTAL MACHINERY COST 7.85 3.59 0.29 14.28 
OPERATING EXPENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Seed lb. PLS 7.00 10.00 70.00 
Fenilizer (0-30-40) lb. N,P,K 
p lb. 0.28 30.00 8.40 
K lb. 0.15 40.00 6.00 
Lime (including application) Ton 12.00 3.00 36.00 
I lerbicide 
atrazine lb. 2.3 1 1.60 3.70 
2,4 D Pt 1.68 1.50 2.52 
TOT AL OPERA TING COSTS 126.62 
TOTAL MACHJNERY COSTS 14.28 
TOTAL OPERA TING COSTS 126.62 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 98.00 
cqui valent) 
TOTAL EST ABUSHMENT COSTS 238.90 
AMORTIZATION FACTOR 11 years @J 6%: 0. 12679 
PRORATED ESTABLISHM~NT 30.29 
COST/ACRE 
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Table 25: Reseeding Costs for Switchgrass Production on Cropland 
PREHARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variab le Labor Total 
OPERATIONS Costs($) Costs($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
Cost/Acre 
($) 
Airflow Spreader (seed & ferti lizers) 1.94 0.91 0. 12 4.03 
Spraying chemical 1.1 6 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOT AL MACHINERY COST 3. 10 1.67 0.16 6.42 
OPERATING EXPENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Seed lb. PLS 7.00 7.00 49.00 
Fertilizer (0-30-40) lb. N,P,K 
p lb. 0.28 30.00 8.40 
K lb. 0. 15 40.00 6.00 
Herbicide 
Atrazine lb. 2.31 1.60 3.70 
2,4D Pt I.68 1.50 2.52 
TOT AL OPERA TING COSTS 69.62 
TOTAL MACHINERY COSTS 6.42 
TOTAL OPERA TING COSTS 69.62 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 98.00 
equivalent) 
TOT AL RESEEDING COSTS 174.03 
TOT AL EXPECTED RESEED Reseed 25% 43.51 
COSTS Prob: 
AMORTIZATION FACTOR 10 years ~ 6%: 0.13587 
PRORATED RESEEDING 5.91 
COST/ACRE 
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Table 26: Annual Costs for witchgrass Production on Cropland 
PRE HARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variable Labor Total 
OPERATIONS Costs($) Costs($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
Cost/Acre 
($) 
Spread liquid nitrogen 1. 16 0.76 0.05 2.39 
Application of P and K 1.60 0.79 0.05 2.88 
Spraying chemical 1.1 6 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOTAL MACHINERY COST 3.92 2.31 0.14 7.66 
OPERA TING EXPENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Nitrogen lb. 0.25 100.00 25.00 
P (removal rate fo r fall harvest) lb. 0.28 11.65 3.26 
K (removal rate for fa ll harvest) lb. 0.15 136.80 20.52 
Herbicide 
Atraz ine lb. 2.31 1.60 3.70 
2,4 0 pt. 1.68 1.50 2.52 
TOTAL OPERATlNG EXPENSES 55.00 
Interest on Operating Expenses 7.0% l.92 
HARVESTING EXPENSES Fixed Variable Labor Total 
Costs Costs Hrs/Acre Cost/Acre 
Mowing/conditioning 3. 16 I. 7 l 0. 12 6.07 
Raking 1.93 1.24 0. 15 4.65 
Baling (large square bales) 28.86 26.04 0.50 59.90 
Staging and loading 0.80 0.54 0.57 7.02 
TOTAL HARVESTING COSTS 34.75 28.53 1.34 77.65 
TOTAL MACHINERY COSTS 7.66 
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 55.00 
fNTEREST ON OPERA TTNG l.92 
EXPENSES (7%) 
HARVEST COSTS 77.65 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 98.00 
equivalent) 
YEARLY PRODUCTI ON 240.23 
COSTS/ACRE 
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APPEND IX B. COST BREAKDO\VN FOR SWITCHGRASS PRODUCTION ON 
GRASSLAND 
Table 27: Establishment Co ts for witchgrass Production on Grassland 
PREHARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variab le Labor Total 
OPERATIONS Costs($) Costs ($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
Cost/Acre 
(S) 
Mow (Rotary) 2.6 1 1.76 0. 11 5.44 
Airflow Spreader (seed & fertili zers) 1.94 0.9 1 0. 12 4.03 
Spraying Roundup® 1.1 6 0.76 0.05 2.39 
Spraying atrazine and 2,4 D 1.1 6 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOTAL MACHINERY COST 6.87 4.19 0.33 14.24 
OPERA TING EX PENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Seed lb. PLS 7.00 10.00 70.00 
Fertilizer (0-30-40) lb. N,P,K 
p lb. 0.28 30.00 8.40 
K lb. O. J 5 40.00 6.00 
Lime (including application) Ton 12.00 3.00 36.00 
Herbicide 
Atraz ine lb . 2.3 1 1.60 3.70 
2,4 D Pt 1.68 1.50 2.52 
Roundup® Qt 12.48 2.00 24.97 
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 151.58 
TOTAL MACHINERY COSTS 14.24 
TOTAL OPERA TING COSTS 15 1.58 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 55.00 
equivalent) 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT COSTS 220.83 
AMORTIZATION FACTOR 11 years ~6%: 0. 12679 
PRORATED ESTABLISHMENT 28.00 
COST/ACRE 
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Table 28: Reseeding Costs for Switchgrass Production on Grassland 
PREHARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variable Labor Tota l 
OPERATlONS Costs($) Costs ($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
Cost/Acre 
($) 
Airflow Spreader (seed & fertili zers) 1.94 0.91 0.12 4.03 
Spraying chemicals 1.16 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOTAL MACHINERY COST 3. 10 1.67 0.16 6.42 
OPERA TING EXPENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Seed lb. PLS 7.00 7.00 49.00 
Fertilizer (0-30-40) lb. N,P,K 
p lb. 0.28 30.00 8.40 
K lb . 0. LS 40.00 6.00 
Herbicide 
Atrazine lb. 2.31 1.60 3.70 
2,4 D Pt 1.68 1.50 2.52 
TOTAL OPERA TING COSTS 69.62 
TOT AL MACHINERY COSTS 6.42 
TOT AL OPERA TING COSTS 69.62 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 55.00 
equivalent) 
TOTAL RESEEDING COSTS 131.03 
TOTAL EXPECTED RESEEDING Reseed 25% 32.76 
COSTS prob: 
AMORTIZATION FACTOR 10 years @ 6%: 0.135 87 
PR ORA TED ESTABLISHMENT 4.45 
COST/ACRE 
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Table 29: Annual Costs for Switchgrass Production on Grassland 
PREHARVEST MACHINERY Fixed Variable Labor Total 
OPERATIONS Costs (S) Co ts($) Hrs/Acre Machinery 
Cost/Acre 
($) 
Spread liquid nitrogen 1. 16 0.76 0.05 2.39 
Application of P and K 1.60 0.79 0.05 2.88 
Spraying chemical 1. 16 0.76 0.05 2.39 
TOT AL MACHINERY COST 3.92 2.3 l 0. 14 7.66 
OPERATING EXPENSES Unit Price/unit Amount Cost/Acre 
Nitrogen lb. 0.25 100.00 25.00 
P (removal rate fo r fall harvest) lb. 0.28 7.76 2.1 7 
K (removal rate for fa ll harvest) lb. 0. 15 9 1.20 13.68 
Herbicide 
atrazine lb. 2.3 1 J.60 3.70 
2,4D pt. 1.68 1.50 2.52 
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 47.07 
Interest on Operating Expenses 7.0% 1.65 
HARV ESTING EXPENSES Fixed Variab le Labor Tota l 
Costs Costs Hrs/Acre Cost/Acre 
Mowing/conditioning 3. 16 1.7 1 0. 12 6.07 
Raking 1.93 1.24 0. 15 4.65 
Baling (large square bales) 19.24 17.36 0.33 39.93 
Staging and loading 0.80 0.54 0.38 5.1 3 
TOTAL HARVESTlNG COSTS 25.13 20.85 0.98 55.78 
TOTAL MACHINERY COSTS 7.66 
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 47.07 
INTEREST ON OPERA TING 1.65 
EXPENSES (7%) 
HAR VEST COSTS 55.78 
LAND CHARGE (Cash rent 55.00 
equivalent) 
YEARLY PRODUCTION 167.16 
COSTS/ACRE 
